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1. INTRODUCTION

Veritas vos liberabit, chanted the scholastics of yesteryear. The truth
will setyoujree, echo their latter-day counterparts in the academy, intoning
the mantra reverentially but with increasingly more hope than confidence,
more faith than conviction.
By and large, universities would like themselves to be perceived as
places of culture in a chaotic world, protectors of reasoned discourse,
peaceful havens where learned professors roam orderly quadrangles and
ponder higher thoughts. Their slick brochures and elegant catalogues
depict a community of scholars, serious and fair-minded at both work and
play, all thirsting for knowledge in sylvan tranquility, all feasting on the
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fruits of unfettered intellectual curiosity, all nurtured in an atmosphere of
invigorating academic freedom, in an altogether overflowing cornucopia in
the ever-bustling marketplace of ideas.
The real world of the academy, of course, is not quite that wonderfulnor nearly as bad as many would suggest. The ironies become palpable,
however, when those self-same institutions, which almost universally view
themselves as bastions of free speech, instead stifle debate that is perceived
as politically incorrect or otherwise embarrassing.
Academic
administrators naturally shy away from conflict and contention. They shun
controversy. They abhor negative publicity of any kind, quelling it as
heavy-handedly as conservative corporations whose primary concern is to
ensure a profitable bottom line. Thus universities have become intuitively
reluctant to sponsor ideas that clash too loudly. The research and
scholarship they most enthusiastically support is that which curries
favorable coverage from the media and attracts large amounts of dollars
from alumni.
It is all the more anomalous that universities appear ignorant of longestablished legal obligations, responsibilities, and limitations, a fact
painfully apparent from the many speech and conduct codes they
promulgate that have been found patently unconstitutiona1. 1
Yet how should such institutions respond when students, professors,
or outsiders foster bigotry and intolerance? Not all controversy on campus,
unfortunately, is in the pursuit of Noble Truth. Must universities provide
an open forum for all points of view, whether well-intentioned or
venomous? Need they accede to demands from student groups or faculty
members seeking to sponsor speakers who are purposefully contentious?
Can they not draw a fair-minded line between civil-rights activists and
hate-mongering bigots, between welfare reformers or publicity-seeking
dissidents, between passionate anti-abortionists who condemn their
opponents as "murderers" and strident anti-Semites who call Jews "bloodsuckers?,,2
Most schools have some sort of procedures in place to deal with
controversial speakers, but few such policies are informed by an adequate
understanding of either constitutional law or academic freedom. Moreover,
the law itself is in a state of flux and conflict, struggling to relax if not
resolve the tension inherent between the First Amendment's guarantee of
free speech and the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of equal protection.

1. See infra Parts I.e., II.A.3.
2. See infra Part I.B.
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There is thus a great need for reasoned guidelines - rules and regulations
that do justice to the academic enterprise without doing violence to the
moral, legal, and social principles upon which legitimate scholarship is
based and from which it derives support.
This article reviews the historical context of controversial speakers on
campus, examines various liberties and limitations accorded them under the
Constitution, and suggests clear and effective standards for dealing with
contentious speech in an academic setting.
II. CATCALLS FROM THE IVORY TOWER: AN HISTORICAL
CONTEXT
A. THE ACADEMIC ENTERPRISE

Thomas Jefferson described the university as a place where "we are
not afraid to follow truth, wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate error so long
as reason is left free to combat it.,,3 That ideal has been frequently
embellished, such as in this statement from the president of Harvard
University:
Universities have a special interest in upholding free speech.
Educational institutions exist to further the search for truth and
understanding and to encourage the personal development of all who
study and work within their walls. Because their right to speak freely
and the opportunity to enjoy an open forum for debate are so closely
related to these central purposes, the university has a stake in free
speech that goes beyond the interest of its members. Its integrity as an
institution is bound up in the maintenance of this freedom, and each
denial of the right to speak diminishes the university itself in some
measure.4
The Supreme Court has steadfastly affirmed the commitment to free
speech in the American public education system.
While school
administrators have an important obligation to maintain order, they must
nevertheless abide by First Amendment principles. "[Neither] students
[nor] teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate."s This is especially true in the public
university arena, where the Court has underscored the importance of
safeguarding academic freedom for the "marketplace of ideas." Thus the
"vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than
3. Alvin L. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of its Students-A Fiduciary Theory,
54 Ky. L.J. 643, 646 (1966) (quoting THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 196 (1859)).
4. Letter from Derek Bok to the Harvard community (Sept. 21,1984).
5. Tinkerv. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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in the community of American schools," and regulations must be struck
down that "cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom 'by violating the
First Amendment.",6
Such noble sentiments, however, have seldom been tested against the
onslaught of hate speech increasingly being uttered on American campuses.
Moreover (as the Supreme Court has likewise recognized), universities
frequently appear ill-equipped to deal with controversial speech from
outsiders: "The relatively placid life of the college campus of the past has
not prepared either administrators or students for their respective
responsibilities in maintaining an atmosphere in which divergent views can
be asserted vigorously, but civilly.,,7
Often, in fact, the three groups primarily involved with deciding who
speaks on campus- administrators, faculty, and students- are confused by
conflicting concepts of constitutional guarantees and restrictions. Few of
them fathom the nuances that differentiate the liberties of private
institutions from the limitations of public ones, nor recognize that the First
Amendment prohibits only the federal government from making any law
"abridging the freedom of speech,,,8 nor that its subsequent application to
the states bridles only state actors. 9
B.

CONTROVERSIES AND REPERCUSSIONS

I. Changing Climates on Campus
Conditions for controversy have long been part of the university
experience: Natural challenges to establishment values, and inherently
diverse student populations, often generate highly-charged confrontations,
many of which can intensify quickly and explode in acrimony. For the
most part, the clashes in the past were ideological in nature, over either
political or philosophical issues involving the competing American values
of individualism and communitarianism, or specific debates about military
actions, religion, abortion, or communism. 10 Nevertheless, few cases

6. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
7. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 195-96 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
8. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
9. The First Amendment's bar against "abridging the freedom of speech" is "among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
10. See LAURENCE MARcuS, FIGlITlNG WORDS: THE POLmCS OF HATEFUL SPEECH (1996)
147-48. Mr. Marcus was a member of the Board of Trustees at Kean College when Khalid
Muhammad appeared there.
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involving controversial speakers on campus were litigated in the courts
before the second half of the twentieth century.
The modem campus free-speech movement was born in 1964 at the
University of California (Berkeley), where thousands of students protested
a university ban against factional fund-raising. The political tides turned
over the next few decades, to a point when in 1993~ United Nations
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick was loudly heckled by a conservative group
called Students Against Intervention in EI Salvador. ll Similar right-wing
protests occurred in 1987 at the Harvard Law School, where a Nicaraguan
resistance leader was shouted off the stage as he was about to begin a
speech,12 and in 1994 at the University of South Florida, where a violent
demonstration resulted from the on-campus appearance of a Cuban exile
who advocated negotiations with Fidel Castro. 13 Even purely political
debate, often cited as the inviolable purpose of the First Amendment, has
been placed off-limits at some educational institutions. 14
Recently, however, the most controversial speakers- whether students,
faculty, or outsiders- represent a new breed: Not only do they cross the
political and ideological spectrum, but they frequently straddle the
exceedingly thin line between controversial speech and hate speech.
Which of their words must be protected, and which can be punished?
Official responses to inflammatory utterances have often been arbitrary,
capricious and unless they are challenged in court and found to be
unconstitutional, chilling if not punitive. Moreover, for every speaker who
prevails in litigation, there are many more who choose not to challenge
their punishments.

11. The university chancellor said he was "embarrassed that Berkeley has been advertised
around the world as a place that succumbed to mob rule," '''and that campus officials were
concerned that speakers who have the philosophy and opinion of the (political) right'" are rarely
invited because offear of disturbances. U.P.I. (Mar. 15, 1983).
12. See Dr. Adolfo Calero, Contra Leader, To Speak at Harvard Law School, PRo
NEWSWIRE, (Nov. 19, 1987).
13. See Marlene Sokol, Violence Mars Exile Leader's Talk, ST. PETERSBURG TIr-.ms, Dec. I,
1994, at lB.
14. See, e.g., Wilson V. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1361 (D. Or. 1976). In 1976, an
Oregon school board issued an order prohibiting "all political speakers" from a public high
school. See also Joan Biskupic, For Justice Thomas, Work is Refuge; After 1 1/2 Years, Cloister of
the Court Extends to Most of His Life, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1993, at AI. Evenjustices of the
Supreme Court are not immune from vociferous dissent when they speak on campus. Most
notable among them recently has been Clarence Thomas, whose appearance at Mercer University
in 1993 elicited loud protests. See id
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2. Civility and Political Correctness
The question in every case is the balance to be struck between the
right to be heard and the right to be protected from offensive speech.
Drawing such a line is especially difficult for civil libertarians who wish
both to defend free speech and to tolerate (or encourage) diversity. They
are likely to experience conflicting sentiments when faced with fact
situations that test each of those often-competing goals. While seeking to
ensure civil discourse, universities often endanger free speech by endorsing
(and enforcing) prevailing notions of political correctness.
At Yale, for example, a student parodying the university's annual
GLAD (Gay and Lesbian Awareness Days) Week hung up a poster
announcing "Bad Week: Bestiality Awareness Days." The student was
charged with "harassment and intimidation" and summoned to appear
before the Yale College Executive Committee, consisting of students,
faculty members, and deans. His hearing was conducted in secret, with no
right of cross-examination. The committee sentenced him to two years'
probation. Its decision was final, unappealable, and not accompanied by a
written explanation. IS
The University of Connecticut determined that a coed had violated the
student behavior code by putting a sign on her dorm-room door: "Preppies,
bimbos, men without chest hair, and homos shot on sight." The code
prohibited "posting or advertising publicly offensive, indecent or abusive
matter concerning persons ... and making personal slurs or epithets based
on race, sex, ethnic origin, disability, religion or sexual orientation." The
university ordered the offending student to move off campus and stay away
from the dorms and cafeterias. 16
15. Calling the student's treatment "absolutely dreadful" and "outrageous," the dean of
Yale's Law School said:

It would have been perfectly appropriate for faculty and administrators to say that the
poster was disgraceful and that he should be ashamed of himself, but he should not
have been in any way punished. I have supported gay rights from the beginning, but
this was an ideological decision by the committee that violates his free speech rights.
Nat Hentoff, Guilty Of Committing Free Speech at Yale, WASH. POST, June 7, 1986, at A23. The
decision against the student was eventually reversed and the penalty rescinded. See Vann
Woodward, Freedom of Speech, Not Selectively, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 1986, at A27; see also
Hyde and Fishman, The Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991: A Response to the New
Intolerance in the Academy, 37 WAYNE L. REv. 1469, 1483 (1991) (suspension eventually
rescinded).
16. The student filed suit, which resulted in the university having to alter the language in its
code to prohibit only confrontational speech that is "'inherently likely to provoke an imminent
violent reaction. '" Lauri A. Ebel, University Anti-Discrimination Codes v. Free Speech, 23 N.M.
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At the University of Pennsylvania, five black females filed
harassment charges after a student who was trying to study shouted out his
dorm window, "[s]hut up, you water buffalo. If you're looking for a party,
there's a zoo a mile from here." University officials asked the student to
apologize in writing to the women for racially harassing them, and noted on
his transcript that he violated the school's racial harassment policy. In
addition, he was placed on residential probation and required to create and
present a diversity-awareness project. 17 At Brown University, which
prohibits making "someone the focus of your joke" on account of his or her
race, an intoxicated student was expelled for shouting anti-black, antiSemitic, and anti-homosexual epithets. ls
Other sanctions are applicable to faculty members and administrators
who, while exercising their rights of free speech, are forced to weather the
competing winds of political correctness. At Harvard, for example, "a
professor was forced to cancel a film in his course because it included a
black maid."19 At the City University of New York, a philosophy professor
was chastised for publishing several articles asserting that blacks were on
average "significantly less intelligent" than whites, and that intellectual
deficiency, not discrimination or poverty, was responsible for the small
numbers of blacks in certain intellectually demanding fields. 20 Although he
said that these findings had been amply confirmed by research, he noted
that they represented his personal views, were made outside of the
classroom, and did not involve indoctrination of students.21 Nevertheless
protests ensued, and the university investigated. It found that the
professor's conclusions had the potential to harm the process of education,
that students should be protected from such harm, and that an alternative
course should be offered.22

L. REv. at 172 (1993) (citing How to Handle Hate on Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1989, at
A30).
17. See Charles Krauthammer, Defining Deviancy Up, THE NEW REpUBLIC, Nov. 22, 1993,
at 24-25.
18. Hyde and Fishman, supra note 15, at 1482, 1488 (quoting Office of Student Life, Brown
Univ., Racism at Brown (1990) and citing Student at Brown is Expelled Under a Rule Barring
"Hate Speech, "N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1991, at AI7). At St John Fisher College, students were
found to have violated the school code when they called the assistant director of campus
ministries a "feminazi" suffering from "penis envy." Id at 1483 (citing Venere, Incident at [St.
John] Fisher [College] Sets offDebate on Campus Speech).
19. Ronald J. Rychlak, Civil Rights, Confederate Flags, and Political Correctness: Free
Speech and Race Relations on Campus, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1411, 1426 (1992).
20. See Levin v. Harleston, 770 F. Supp. 895, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), (affd in part, 966 F.2d
85,87 (2d Cir. 1992)).
21. See id. at 908.
22. See id. at 906-07. In a civil action against the university, the professor prevailed. The
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Other scholars who speak on campus about racial differences
experience similar reactions. William Shockley, a Nobel Laureate in
Physics who held controversial views on the supposed genetic inferiority of
blacks, was prevented from speaking at Yale in 1974.23 The University of
Tennessee invited Charles Murray, whose 1994 book, The Bell Curve,
contended that intelligence levels differ among ethnic groups (with blacks
and Hispanics near the lowest level), to speak on campus in Chattanooga.
A group of area teachers urged that his appearance be canceled. By giving
Murray a forum in which to deliver his message, they said, UTC would be
endorsing ie4 More recently, there were calls for the removal of a law
professor at the University of Texas who aired his view that white students
are academically superior to black and Hispanic students.25
At the University of New Hampshire, a professor was disciplined for
violating the school's sexual harassment policy after several women in his
technical writing course complained about an example he used to explain
the meaning of the word simile: "Belly dancing is like jello on a plate with
a vibrator under the plate." The professor received a suspension without
pay for one year and was ordered to attend counseling sessions.26
When a dean at Yale urged students to consider the study of Western
civilization as one of the most important fields offered in the curriculum,
his remarks were branded as "racist," "sexist," and "obnoxious" by various
groups on campus, especially blacks and feminists, seeking to root out what
they perceived as vestiges of a culture dominated by white European
males. 27
United States Court of Appeals found that his First Amendment rights had been abridged, that the
university could not punish him for his beliefs, and that even the threat of discipline (through the
investigating committee) had a chilling effect on his freedom of expression. See Levin, 966 F. 2d
85,90.
23. Shockley created a similar stir at Princeton University in 1973. See Priscilla Van Tassel,
Bowen Reviews His Years At Princeton, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29,1987, at 1; Woodward, supra note
15, atBI.
24. Faculty organizers of the lecture held fIrm, stating, "[w]e're not in the business of telling
people what to think. We're in the business of telling people how to think for themselves."
Moreover, he pointed out, Murray's lecture would be followed by a speaker with an opposing
viewpoint. Denise Neil, Teachers Ask UTe to Drop Author's Talk, CHAITANOOGA TIMES, Sept.
21,1996,atBl,B8.
25. In this case the demands were thwarted by arguments citing tenure, academic freedom,
and the First Amendment. See Nicole Cazarez, Professor Graglia's Views Odious, Not
Unspeakable, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 16, 1997, at A2 I.
26. See Silva v. University of New Hampshire, 888 F. Supp. 293, 299, 311 (D.N.H. 1994).
The professor brought suit against the University and its officials for violating his rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 332.
27. Stephen Goode, A Yale Dean Takes On The Thought Police, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 16,
1991, at EI.
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Although students, professors, and administrators who pursue their
rights in court are often ultimately deemed protected by both the First
Amendment and the concept of academic freedom,28 that result cannot be
expected as a matter of course. At San Bernardino Community College, a
professor was accused of sexual harassment for assigning provocative
essays, using profanities in class, and discussing obscene subjects, such as
having consensual sex with children.29 The board of trustees ordered him
to provide a syllabus at the beginning of each class concerning his course
objectives, attend a sexual harassment seminar, and undergo a formal
evaluation. The professor sued, but a district court held that the classroom
comments were matters of public concern, and that the professor's First
Amendment interests were outweighed by the college's interest in
effectively educating its students and in preventing a hostile, sexually
discriminatory environment which would disrupt the educational process.30
Outsiders seeking a campus platform (the primary focus of this
Article) present questions that are even more problematic. In 1946,
members of a California branch of the American Civil Liberties Union
were required to take loyalty oaths as a precondition to their use of a public
high school auditorium. (Ironically the ACLU wished to hold a series of
meetings on "Bill of Rights in Postwar America).,,3! Similarly, in 1962
Hunter College refused to allow the National Review to use its facilities for
a series of conservative lectures.32 The school declared its policy in a letter
from the president: Its campus was not available to "political or other
public movements or groups in presenting a distinct position or point of
view opposed by substantial parts of the public.,,33
28. See infra Section II.B.
29. See Cohen v. San Bernardino College, 883 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
30. See id at 1411, 1421. The court also found that the discipline imposed was narrowly
tailored and that the college's sexual harassment policy was not impermissibly vague or
overbroad. See id. at 1421.
31. The requirement was tested in court and struck down: While the state is not required to
open school doors to outside speakers, said the court, once it does so it cannot exclude them for
unconstitutional reasons. See Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 171 28 P.2d 885, 88788,891 (Ca 1946).
32. See Buckley v. Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924,927 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962).
33. Id. A court subsequently found that various Hunter regulations (for example, that
programs must be "compatible with the aims of [the] College as a public institution of higher
learning") were unconstitutionally vague and content-discriminatory. Id at 929-30, 935. In 1968
restrictive speech statutes in two states were likewise held void for vagueness: a North Carolina
law which prohibited speech by those who were known to be Communists or who had pleaded
the Fifth Amendment with respect to subversive activities. See Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp.
486, 488, 490, 498-99 (M.D.N.C. 1968). The court noted, nevertheless, that "the Communist
conspiracy is dedicated to the destruction of freedom, and attempts to achieve its goals of world
conquest through discord, deceit and untruths." Id. at 497. That same year a North Dakota
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In 1969 the University of Mississippi barred several speakers,
including civil-rights activist Charles Evers, from appearing at the
invitation of the student Young Democratic Club in support of the
Humphrey-Muskie presidential ticket. 34 That same year the president of
Auburn University, a public institution in Alabama, banned the Reverend
William Sloan Coffin from speaking on campus on the ground that he
might advocate breaking the law.35 In 1981, an appearance at Carlow
College by Sarah Weddington, whose arguments before the Supreme Court
in Roe v. Wade contributed to its decision striking down state laws
prohibiting abortions, was canceled by the college president.36 Similarly, a
1986 speech at Catholic University by Eleanor Smeal, then president of the
National Organization of Women, was canceled because some students
complained that her support for legalized abortion conflicted with Catholic
doctrine. 37

provision that "[prohibited] trustees of a state-owned university from extending use of university
to facilities to subversive organizations or their representatives" was struck down. Snyder v.
Board ofTrustees of the University ofIlIinios, 286 F. Supp. 927, 927 (N.D. III. 1968).
34. See Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 967 n.l, 972-973 (N.D. Miss. 1969). The court
found that the university had not provided for a fair and adequate review of its president's
decision to exclude a speaker. See id at 974. Nor were students able to invite speakers
themselves. See id at 974, n.24. To the contrary, the university's rules barmed political and
religious speakers arbitrarily, and all those whose presence would "constitute a clear and present
danger" on campus (an invalid prior restraint). See id at 974-76, n.26, n.28, n.3l. The court held
that
speaker regulations may validly provide that no request for a speaker will be honored
unless made to the university by a recognized student or faculty group within a
reasonable period of time prior to the proposed speaking engagement, setting forth the
name of the requesting student organization, the proposed date, time and location of
the meeting, the expected size of the audience and the time of the speech.
[d. at 972-73. The executive head of the institution could approve the speaker, but he had to act
according to procedural due process and not with "unbridled discretion." [d. at 973. The court
went on to supply a detailed set of regulations for use by the state's universities. See id at 97980.
35. See Brooks v. Auburn University, 296 F. Supp. 188, 190 (M.D. Ala. 1969), affirmed, 412
F.2d 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1969). The speaker at issue in this case was the Reverend William
Sloan Coffin. The president was found to have violated the First Amendment by prohibiting the
speech. The court noted that the speaker had been requested by a student organization and had
been initially approved; that the president could have rejected the speaker if he reasonably
thought that by doing so he would prevent violence or disorder; and that the time, place, and
manner of the speech could likewise have been regulated. Here, however, the university had no
rules or regulations governing speaker eligibility, and the reasons invoked by the president had
never been previously used to bar a speaker. See Brooks, 412 F.2d 1171, 1172-73.
36. See U.P.1. (Oct. 20, 1981).
37. U.P.1. (Jan. 28, 1986).
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3. Afro-Centrism and Anti-Semitism
Anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist speakers began to surface on college
campuses in the mid-1980's. One of them was Kwame Toure (known in an
earlier incarnation as the black activist Stokely Carmichael), who in 1986
appeared at the University of Maryland where, among other outrageous
statements, he offered his opinion that "[t]he only good Zionist is a dead
Zionist."38 Similar incidents have increased in recent years in both number
and intensity. Perhaps most notable among the speakers have been AfroCentrists, such as Louis Farrakhan, Leonard Jeffries, Tony Martin, and,
probably the most inflammatory of them all, Khalid Abdul Muhammad. In
November of 1993, Muhammad appeared at Kean College, a public
institution in New Jersey. There, punctuating his remarks with references
to "Columbia Jew-niversity" and "Jew York City," he said:
The so-called Jews... crawled out of the caves and heels of
Europe ... [and] slept in urination and ... defecation, generation after
generation for 2,000 years. .. [They] knocked [their] animals in the
head with clubs ... and suck[ed] the blood from the raw meat, and ...
still eat ... meat raw to this very day. .. [T]he white so-called Jew
slumlords in the black community are sucking our blood . .. [They]
got what was coming to them in Nazi Germany... [They] control the
White House and the media... [They] own the Federal Reserve
System ... Everybody always talk about what Hitler did to the Jews,
but don't nobody ever asks, "What did the Jews do to Hitler?" The
Jews had undermined the very fabric of society of that society. The
way they do wherever they go .. .39

Jews weren't the only objects of Khalid Muhammad's scorn. He
called the pope a "no good... cracker," and suggested that someone
should "raise that dress up and see what's really under there.'>4O He issued
this rhetorical ultimatum to the whites of South Africa:
If [they] won't get out of town by sundown, we kill everything white
that ain't right in South Africa. We kill the women. We kill the
children. We kill the babies. We kill the blind. We kill the crippled.
We kill the faggot. We kill the lesbian. We kill them all ... Kill the
old ones too... Kill the crazy. Goddammit, and when you get
through killing 'em all, go to the God danm graveyard and dig up the

38. Barbara Vobejda, U. Md Struggles With Issue of Free Speech, WASH. POST, Mar. 2,
1986, atB4.
39. Speech, The Secret Relationship Between Blacks and Jews, N.J. L.J., Jan. 24, 1994, at 17;
see also MARCUS, supra note 10, at xvii.
40. MARCUS, supra note 10, at xvii.
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grave and kill 'em. God damn, again, 'cause they didn't die hard
enough.41
The audience, which was nearly all black, laughed and applauded. 42
A few months later Muhammad appeared at Howard University, a
publicly-funded institution in Washington, D.C. He had been invited by a
student group called Unity Nation.43 Before he spoke there was an antiJewish rally led by Unity Nation's leader, a law student named Malik Zulu
Shabazz.44 The speech itself, in which Muhammad declared that "America
was founded on separation," and "labeled George Washington and Thomas
Jefferson as criminals who owned slaves and raped black slave women,"
was enthusiastically received by a crowd of close to 1000.45 Afterwards,
Howard President, Franklyn Jenifer, condemned the ethnic bias displayed
at the rally but defended the forum in which it was held. 46 Jenifer added
that he was a deep believer in the First Amendment and academic freedom,
and that he had often taken the unpopular position that speech should never
be suppressed unless it directly endangers lives.
It is far better to allow the expression of hateful views in the light

of day, where they can be exposed for what they are: vile,
hurtful, insensitive, and wrong. Instead of sacrificing the First
Amendment rights that are so precious to us all, we should use
[them] to counter and condemn such views.47
Muhammad was invited back to Howard, along with Jeffries and
Martin, in April of 1994. In the interim, the university postponed a lecture
to be given by a Jewish history professor from Yale for fear that he would

41. MARcus, supra note lO, at xvii.
42. See id. Muhammad had been invited to Kean by the college's student organization,
which paid him a lecture fee of $2,650. See also No Laughing Matter, THE RECORD, Dec. 21,
1993, at C7; Jon Nordheimer, Angry Echoes o/Campus Speech, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 26, 1994, at
B4.
43. See Mensah Dean, Muhammad Speaks at Howard, WASH. TiMEs, Feb. 24, 1994,atC7.
44. In February 1994, Shabazz warmed up the audience for Khalid Muhammad: "Who is it
that controls the media and Hollywood in America?" {Audience: "Jews!"} Shabazz: "Who is it
that has our entertainers in a vice grip and our athletes in their vice grip?" {Audience: "Jews!"}
Shabazz: "Who is it that has been spying on black leaders and spying on Martin Luther King and
set up his death?" {Audience: "Jews!"}. Susan Baer and Michael Fletcher, Howard 0.: 'A
Citadel o/Hate'?, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, May 8,1994.
45. Dean, supra note 43.
46. Id. Between the two rallies, the university by "mutual agreemenf' postponed a speech by
a Jewish history professor from Yale, who said he was concerned about walking into a hostile
environment. See Kimberly Goad, UT-Dallas Taps a Controversial Administrator as its New
Chief, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 18, 1994, at IE.
47. Franklyn G. Jenifer, Hate Speech Is Still Free Speech, N.Y. TiMES, May 13, 1994, at
A31.
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be subjected to heckling and harassment because of his ethnicity.
Ironically, Professor David Brion Davis, whose book, The Problem of
Slavery in Western Culture, won a Pulitzer Prize in 1967, "was to have
lectured on the Haitian Revolution of 1791, the first large-scale and
successful uprising of black slaves in the New World.,,48
At Muhammad's second coming, the university's security forces
prevented Jewish protesters from demonstrating. Inside, tables were lined
with anti-Semitic books. As the auditorium was filling, black men were
given priority seating.49 During his speech, which was cheered by many of
the 2,000 in attendance, Khalid declared, "he loves Colin Ferguson, who
killed all those white folks on the Long Island train." He also said, "I am
going to be like a pit bull. That is the way I am going to be against the
Jews. I am going to bite the tail of the honkies."5o
The remarks were widely reported, and caused a furor both at Howard
and elsewhere, including on the floor of the United States Congress. 51 The
fallout was extensive. A member of the board of trustees at Howard
advocated a more restrictive code of conduct for campus clubs and the
speakers they sponsor.52 At least one corporate donor decided to stop
contributing to the university, and the United Negro College Fund received
a flood of angry calls and letters.53 Needless to say, Khalid's speech also
served to tarnish the image of the student body and faculty at Howard. Nor
were the ironies lost on outside observers. Commenting on the different
receptions given to Muhammad and Davis, the Boston Globe editorialized
that the university's president "protected incitement to violence as
academic freedom and then told Davis he could not be protected against
those who were incited. Something sinister is happening at Howard.',s4
Under increasing pressure from within and without, Howard's board
of trustees ultimately forced the resignation of the president. 55 But the
48. Steven A. Hoimes, Howard University Postponed Lecture by a Jewish Historian, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 1994, at 9; see Steven A. Hoimes, Struggling Through Crises at Howard
University, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1994, at AI; Sean Piccoli, Decision Upsets Howard Students
Jewish Scholar's Lecture Postponed, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 17, 1994, at Al O.
49. See Piccoli, supra note 48.
50. Wendy Melillo and Hamil R. Harris, Dissent Raised as Ex-Farrakhan Aide Returns to
Howard U., THE WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1994, at B 1.
51. See George Rooney, UCR Group Pressing to Thwart Muhammad, PRESS ENTERPRISE,
May 27, 1994,atBI.
52. See Hoimes, supra note 48.
53. See Hatemongering at Howard, BALTIMORE SUN, May 24, 1994, at 12A.
54. The Misuse ola University, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21,1994, at 18.
55. See Brooke Masters, Howard U. Condemns Bigotry, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1994, at B1.
The president, Franklyn G. Jenifer, insisted that his departure was unrelated to the incident. See
Jenifer, supra note 47, at 42.
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backlash continued. A syndicated columnist echoed the sentiment on the
minds of many civil libertarians:
Indifference to bigotry is not the same as bigotry itself, but it is too
close for comfort. Indifference gives bigots running room ....
Howard had an obligation to respond to the use of its campus by
bigots. It did nothing of the sort, not at first, anyway, and not when it
counted most. If Howard is indeed the Harvard of black colleges, then
it ought to think of how it would have reacted if an anti-black rally had
been held at Harvard itself, and produced nothing but a yawn. With
prestige comes obligation .... Neither the First Amendment nor the
principle of academic freedom means that hatred has to be met with
silence. The school has learned a lesson. A pity it didn't teach it
itself.56

There were repercussions for Khalid Muhammad as well. He was
subsequently denied platforms at Emory, Howard again, and the University
ofToronto.57 In 1994, he was shot and wounded at a California rally. 58 In
1998 he fled New York after police threatened to arrest him for fomenting
a riOt. 59
The central theme ofFarrakhan, Jeffries, and Martin has been slightly
less contentious, blaming Jews for leading the enslavement of blacks in the
United States and minimalizing their place in the history of oppression. At
first Farrakhan sought to dismiss the uproar surrounding Khalid
Muhammad as the product of a Jewish conspiracy. "They're trying to use
my brother Khalid's words against me to divide this house. ... They're
Then, although distancing himself from
plotting as we speak."
Muhammad's rhetorical excesses, he said, "r stand by the truths Khalid ...
spoke.,,60
Farrakhan's Nation ofIslam proclaims loudly that Jewish suffering in
World War II pales in comparison to that of blacks over the centuries. His
take on the Holocaust is that "Little Jews died while big Jews made money;
little Jews were being turned into soap while big Jews washed themselves
with it." "Anti-Semitic materials like The Protocols of the Elders of Zion
56. Richard Cohen, What Happened at Howard, WASH. POST, July 19, 1994, atAl7.
57. In early 1994 the "Black Youth Congress," a student group at the University of Toronto,
invited Muhammad to speak. Canada's Ministry of Immigration, responding to lobbying by the
Canadian Jewish Congress, refused to issue him a visitor's pennit on the grounds that he had a
criminal record and that they had reason to believe he would violate Canada's hate-crime statutes.
See Clyde Farnsworth, Canada Bars Speech by Ex-Aide ofFarrakhan, N.Y. 'liMEs, May 1, 1994,
at 10.
58. See Bill Whitaker, CBS Morning News, May 30,1994.
59. See Tom Topousis and Adarn Miller, Safir: Throw 'Coward' Khalid in Slammer N.Y.
POST, Sept. 7, 1998, at 4.
60. Hentoff, supra note 15; see also Baer and Fletcher, supra note 44.
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continue to be available" wherever Farrakhan speaks. 6\ Hitler, he says,
"was a very great man." Judaism, he declares, "is a dirty religion.,,62
Subsequent to Khalid Muhammad's incendiary appearance at Kean
College, the college president asked for legal advice on whether it could
bar Farrakhan (his erstwhile mentor) from speaking there. The answer
"no" Game in a written opinion from the attorney general of New York:
"any content-based restriction imposed by a state college on studentsponsored speakers invited by campus groups is subject to a strict scrutiny
analysis and is likely to be held unconstitutional.,,63
In 1993 Jeffries "told a packed house at the Johns Hopkins University
that Jews dominated the slave trade, that they continue to control the
nation's power and wealth, and that the white man of any faith represents
the devil.,,64 Jeffries was removed from his position as chairman of the
African Studies Department at CUNY, after a 1992 speech in which he
argued that Jews had financed the Atlantic slave trade and spoke of a
"conspiracy, planned and plotted and programmed out of Hollywood" by
Jews and the Italian Mafia to denigrate blacks in films and bring about the
"destruction of black people.,,65 Jeffries sued. A federal court held that
CUNY had violated his First Amendment rights by punishing him solely on
his views. 66 This portion of the decision was affirmed by the United States
Court of Appeals, but in 1996 CUNY eliminated Jeffries' department,
moving its faculty into a broader ethnic studies division. 67
In 1998 Jeffries was invited to speak at the College of Staten Island.
The Jewish Defense Organization threatened "to make life miserable" for
both the speaker and those who had invited him. "Free speech ends when

61. Aryeh Cohen, Antisemitic Violence Continues to Decline, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 23,
1998, at 1 (italics added).
62. Kenneth Lasson, The Tintinnabulation ofBell's Letters, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 18,21 1996.
63. MARcus, supra note 10, at xxi; see James Abearn, Professor Suggests How to Deal with
Campus Hate Speeches, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Oct. 29, 1996, at A15.
64. Kenneth Lasson, Campuses and Common Sense, BALTIMORE EVENING SUN, Mar. 16,
1994, at 11A (noting that Jeffries' appearance was sponsored by university funds).
65. Karen Arenson, Divided Campus Prepares for an Address by Jeffries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
1,1998, atB3; see Karen Arenson, On Campus, The Cases For and Against Jeffries, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 1998, at B3 (providing that in his 1992 speech Jeffries had labeled blacks as "sun people"
and whites as "ice people." He also said of the latter: "[y]ou, the intelleclually dead, are hereby
fonnally notified that my intentions are not to offend anyone. It is to speak the truth as I knew it
and to ensure to the best of my abilities, the survival of the White Race."). See Jeffries v.
Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066, 1071, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd in part, 21 F.3d 1238, 1242 (2d
Cir. 1994), cert. granted andjudgmentvacated by 513 U.S. 996 (1994).
66. See Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. 1066, 1098 (stating that "Jeffries is entitled to the
constilutional protection that surrounds his speech and professional activities.").
67. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 1250 (2d Cir. 1994).
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bigotry begins," the group's national director said. "Academic freedom
does not mean the right to teach or preach hate, and Jeffries is doing both."
Others on campus said they thought the choice of Jeffries as a speaker was
more likely to discourage than encourage the flow of ideas and were put off
by what they perceived as his anti-Semitism. The speech was canceled at
the last minute because of a financial dispute. 68
By his own count Jeffries has appeared at over 300 campuses since
the notorious 1992 speech. According to him, the College of Staten Island
was the only school that has ever turned him away.69 Like Jeffries, Martin
frequently expounds upon what he calls "the Black Holocaust," which he
describes as the "annihilation of300 million of our people.,,70 As chairman
of the black studies department at Wellesley College in Massachusetts, he
is a leading proponent of "Afrocentrism," whose adherents maintain that
white scholars have covered up, for racist reasons, the cultural debt Europe
owes to South Africa.71 "[S]tudents are told that Greece was an Egyptian
colony, Greek philosophy was based on black wisdom and famous figures
of the ancient world, such as Socrates and Cleopatra, were black. 72
When a colleague at Wellesley challenged those claims, Martin
responded angrily by charging that she was at the heart of a Jewish
conspiracy to discredit black scholarship, an assertion that he presented
elaborately in a book entitled The Jewish Onslaught: Dispatches from the
Wellesley Battlefront. 73
Martin assigns his students a book published by the Nation of Islam
68. See Arenson, On Campus, supra note 65, at B3. Jeffries showed up later on campus to
have an infonnal chat; he was prevented from entering by security guards. See id
69. See Arenson, On Campus, supra note 65, at B3. In 1992 Jeffries' appearance at the
University of South Florida elicited "shock ... dismay and ... disgust" from the southern area
director of the Anti-Defamation League. Janice Martin, League Decries Controversial Speaker at
USF, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1992, atB3.
70. Hillel Juttler, A One-Upmanship of Horrors in Holocaust Comparisons, JERUSALEM
POST, May 4, 1994, at 7.
71. Anthony Flint, Black Academics Split on Afrocentrism, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 1994,
at I.
72. See Michael Gove, The Woman Who Defied Political Correctness, THE TIMEs, Sept. 2,
1996, at 15.
73. See id. The professor who challenged Martin was Maxy Lefkowitz, who questioned one
of his course descriptions in a faculty meeting and critically debunked Afrocentrism as myth in
THE NEW REpUBLIC, as well as in her own subsequent book, NOT OUT OF AFRICA. A self-styled
"skeptical feminist," Lefkowitz draws parallels between Afrocentrists and radical feminists who
rewrite history for their own ideological purposes: "They twisted the truth and blamed past
inequalities on patriarchal oppression when what limited women's lives was their biology ...
What liberated women was science, not politics; what will help black students is knowledge, not
attitudes." See generally Irene Sege, Teaching History or Hate, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 1994,
at 51.
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entitled The Secret Relationship Between Blacks and Jews, which claims
that Jews played a dominant role in the slave trade. 74 He also published
what he called a "'broadside' against 'the privileged and powerful U.S.
Jewish leadership and their unthinking Negro stooges,''' in which he views
"the charge of anti-Semitism ... as a weapon ... that has been used by the
Jewish leadership over the years to beat people over the head with.,,7s
The difficulty of drawing a line between controversial and offensive
views is well illustrated by Martin's arguments. The fact that they are
delivered in the scholarly voice, lending them a patina of authenticity,
makes them particularly pernicious. Martin's critics find his claims
disturbingly reminiscent of those made in classic anti-Semitic tracts like the
Protocols of the Elders of Zion. His own book (The Jewish Onslaught)
"goes back and forth between fact and fiction and sees a conspiracy and
finds enemies at every comer," says a sociologist at Wellesley who uses it
in a course on propaganda. "He'll talk about perfectly reasonable issues,
like the marginality of blacks in America, and then come back to Jews.,,76
C. INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO DATE
Having to respond to various kinds of controversial speech, whether
political or bigoted, discriminatory or harassing, from students or faculty or
outsiders, universities have found themselves in an uncomfortable
quandary. It is often difficult to draw a line between honest opinions and
hate-filled vitriol, between intellectually defensible, but radical ideas and
unconcealed exhortations to genocide. Universities seeking to honor both
the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and the Fourteenth
Amendment's promise of equal protection often find themselves faced with
having to reconcile the historic tension between the two principles, in
situations where there can be no clear winners.77
It is all the more difficult to apply principles to facts when
controversial speech leaves the parties involved fragmented, but each with
a constitutional argument to support its position. For example, there were
those who felt that (a) Kean College properly granted an open forum to
74. See generally HISTORICAL RESEARCH DEPAR1MENT, THE NATION OF ISLAM, The Secret
Relationship Between Blacks and Jews (1991). This assertion has been widely criticized as
baseless by many historians including Harvard's Henry Louis Gates, who is black and whom
Martin calls an Uncle Tom. See generally AD! REpORT ON WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR TONY
MARTIN (1995); Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Black Demagogues and Pseudo-Scholars, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20,1992, at A19.
75. Sege, supra note 73 (internal quotation omitted).
76. Id.
77. See MARCUS, supra note 10, at 114.
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Khalid Abdul Muhammad as a matter of First Amendment right, even ifhis
views were offensive; (b) that he should have been heard as an articulate
advocate of Afrocentrism, which is a legitimate historical perspective; (c)
that his appearance should have been set in the format of a debate, where
his words could have been immediately challenged; or (d) that he should
never have been allowed to speak because his remarks were anathema to
the school's educational mission. 78
Traditional champions of free expression argue that it is impossible to
draw a line between legitimate political speech, even if offensive or nonconstructive, and clearly destructive hate speech. They are fully sensitive
to the paradoxical position into which they are cast, rendered both
conservative and reactionary, because they are called upon both to defend
outrageous speakers and to attack their opponents for denying them their
rights. At Yale in the mid-1970's, prominent speakers with unpopular
views, ranging from defenders of the Vietnam War to proponents of white
supremacy, were invited to address campus groupS.79 The tempestuous
reactions they engendered led to an unequivocal defense of speakers' rights
embodied in a statement called "Report of the Committee on Freedom of
Expression at Yale."so At its core was a declaration that the university must
do everything possible to ensure within it the fullest degree of intellectual
freedom, and that "it may sometimes be necessary. .. for civility and
mutual respect to be superseded by the need to guarantee free expression ..
. because obstruction of such expression threatens the central function of
the university."sl "We don't invite people here because we agree with
them," agreed the president of Princeton University. "The right question,
well phrased, can be far more effective than preventing people from
speaking.,,82
But free-speech advocates are often selective in the interests they
wish to defend, and are subject to the "tyranny of group selfrighteousness."s3 Nowhere is this more evident than in the proliferation of
campus spe~ch and conduct codes, which have been increasingly adopted
and enforced in recent years by both private and public universities. They
78. Id. at 113.
79. Woodward,supranote 15,atA27.
80. Id.
81. Hentoff, supra note 15, at A23; see also Woodward, supra note 15, at A27; see generally
Stephen Goode, A Yale Dean Takes On The Thought Police, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1991, at El;
see also MARcus, supra note 10, at 122.
82. Priscilla Van Tassel, Bowen Revielvs His Years At Princeton, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29,
1987, at Section 11.
83. "They are on the left and right .... They are terrorists of the mind." Hentoff, supra note
15 (quoting Bartlett Giamatti, President of Yale University).
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generally cover the speech and conduct of all members of a university
community, including faculty. A typical code defines harassment to
include, "any conduct, verbal or physical, on or off campus. .. which
creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive educational, work, or living
environment" and is premised on the ideas that (a) while freedom of
expression is essential in a university, so is freedom from unreasonable and
disruptive offense; and (b) it is usually easier to deal with such questions if
one thinks in terms of interests rather than rights. 84 The number of colleges
and universities that have adopted such regulations is large and appears to
be growing.85 Their sponsors have apparently been undeterred by the fact
that not a single code has yet passed constitutional muster. 86
Public high schools are able to promulgate more restrictive
procedures than universities. Thus a school district policy can require
teachers to get approval of principals before they can invite guest speakers
to their classrooms. In addition, parents must be notified of controversial
speakers, and students may be excused from the presentations with a
parent's permission. Such regulations have been set in place to combat
speakers on gay and lesbian rightS. 87
Every college and university also has different administrative ways
and means for dealing with controversial speakers, most of which have
inherent and potential drawbacks.
A sampling of representative
institutions, including three small colleges and two major universities, is
illustrative. At College A, a rural school which receives some state support
for buildings and equipment, outside speakers may be brought onto campus
via (a) a "Programs Board," with an annual budget of approximately
$4000; (b) the College Activities Office, which spends about $1500
annually, or (c) individual academic departments. Controversial speakers
must be approved by the college president, the dean of student affairs, and
the student government association. Campus security personnel determine

84. The language is derived from the code at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Bob Chatelle, Democracy is Not for the Thin Skinned, NEWSL. OF THE POL. ISSUES COMM. OF
TIlE NAT'L WRITERS UNION, Nov. 1993.
For web site on hate speech codes, see
<http://joc.mit.eduldocs/chatelle.speech.codes.txt>.
85. One observer notes that some 700 colleges and universities have enacted hate speech
codes by 1990. See Thomas A. Schweitzer, Hate Speech On Campus and The First Amendment:
Can They Be Reconciledl, 27 CONN. L. REv. 493, 505 nAO (1995) ("[A]pproximately 200
universities had enacted hate speech codes."). Id
86. See Lauri A. Ebel, University Anti-Discrimination Codes v. Free Speech, 23 N.M. L.
REv. 169, 179 (1993).
87. See, e.g., Sonya Gray, Some Area Schools Have Speaker Policies, PROVIDENCE
JOURNAL-BULLETIN, Feb. 23, 1994, at IB; Elaine Williams, Lewiston Schools Consider Policy
on Guest Speakers, LEWISTON MORNING TRIBUNE, Dec. 13, 1992, at 2C.
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whether local police should be called in. The school always provides for a
question-and-answer session after each speech. Result: Perhaps because of
its very low budget for bringing in outside speakers, College A has not
experienced a significant speech controversy in the past twenty years. 88

College B is a private coed school with no written policy on outside
speakers. They are brought in by three groups: student clubs (usually in
conjunction with academic departments), an office of public events, or the
student government association. The school uses a generic hiring contract,
budgeting no more than three thousand dollars for each speaker. Proposals
are passed on, respectively, by the director of student activities, the vicepresident of the college, and the dean of students. If the issue being
addressed is controversial, speakers with opposing viewpoints are sought or
counter-demonstrations encouraged.
Result:
Although security
arrangements would probably be a greater concern at College B, it too has
not had a controversial speaker on campus in many years. 89
College C is a state-run liberal-arts school, which considers itself to
be open to all kinds of speakers, regardless of the nature of their speech.
Funding may come from the office of student development, academic
departments, the student government association (which has a lectures
committee), or the department of lectures and fine arts, which any student
can petition to invite a speaker. If a situation would arise where a
suggested speaker's appearance was likely to cause turmoil, the director of
student development would confer with the dean of student affairs, who
might present the question to the college president and others. Result:
College C has never had to use any type of security for a visiting speaker.90
At University A, a prestigious private institution, most speakers are
brought to campus by student clubs or academic departments, at relatively
low cost. Each fall the university sponsors a major and widely advertised
month-long symposium on a topic of current interest. The symposium is
organized by students, who invite from five to eight speakers to participate.
Every speaker has to have a contract, either one of his/her own or the form
contract supplied by the university. All speakers must ultimately be
approved by the director of student activities.
If the speaker is
controversial, the school will decide whether it can afford the necessary
security. If it cannot, the speaker doesn't come. University A has never
88. Recently some students painted graffiti with soap to protest a speaker. It was quietly
cleaned up by housekeeping.
89. Hillary Clinton spoke on campus a year or so ago, but the first Lady brought her own
security.
90. Normally such students have already gone to the Student Development Office and been
rejected. Consider, however, that College C is in a rural area and has only about 1400 students.
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canceled a speaker due to the nature of his/her speech. Its only
considerations appear to be the cost of security. Controversial speakers
appear at University A with some frequency, and student protests are not
uncommon. The director of student activities meets with complaining
students to discuss ramifications of their disaffection. He may consult with
the dean of students. He often suggests post-program discussion groupS.91
University B is one of the state's flagship schools, a major research
facility located just outside a large city. Speakers are brought to campus by
student clubs, academic departments, and a lectures committee of the
student events board. The lectures committee uses student activity fees to
pay speakers. Its funds are limited, so usually the topic of the proposed
speech becomes more important than the speaker, especially in view of the
fact that bigger-name speakers, including those with some notoriety, are
more expensive.
Any issues involving a controversial speaker's
appearance on campus would initially be discussed within the student
events board, with the director of student activities next, and finally, the
vice president for student affairs. 92
Neither of the major universities have firm policies dealing with the
multifarious exigencies occasioned by controversial speakers, perhaps
because all events differ according to context: the tenor of the times,
nature of the forum, current tensions on campus, and the size and makeup
of the student body. Some, like Howard University in the wake of its
traumatic experiences with Khalid Muhammad, are struggling with how to
handle similar conflicts in the future. All wish to honor the noble
American tradition of free speech, but few are certain about making the
difficult decisions on who should bear the cost of additional security when
it is deemed necessary.

91. The university does not typically look for public assistance with security, although its
special events office, which sometimes brings in heads of states, almost always uses local police
to help. One of the most controversial recent speakers was Leonard Jeffries, a black supremacist
who is widely known for his anti-Semitic remarks. The Director of Student Activities organized
post-program events. There were some peaceful protests during the speech.
92. The most recent controversial speaker at University B was Johnny Cochran, the lead
defense attorney in the O.J. Simpson murder trial. Cochran's contract required that he be
provided with a certain amount of security, which was supplied by a private security agency hired
by the Director of Student Activities.
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III. LIBERTIES AND LIMITATIONS: THE CONSTITUTION ON
CAMPUS
A. PRINCIPLES OF FREE SPEECH
"[T]he best test of truth," said Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.,,93 This axiom can be proven only where freedom of expression,
which may be the central characteristic of a democratic society based on
popular self-governance, is unfettered. Such a liberty also serves to
promote flexibility in the growth and development of a democracy by
allowing for reasoned dialogue, and to maintain a healthy balance between
stability and change.94 The university should both encourage that dialogue
and seek that balance.
The traditional view of the First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech as virtually absolute, allowing few and narrow exceptions, reflects
the Founding Fathers' dedication to an open and vigorous exchange of
ideas. The theory is that those thoughts that are abhorrent to a free society,
goes the argument, will fester if suppressed but wither when aired.
Moreover, who is to decide which ideas are offensive? "'Freedom of
speech is so precious and delicate a liberty that it must be preserved at great
cost: Thus the depth of conviction in Voltaire's oft-quoted declaration, 'I
disapprove of what you say but I will defend to the death your right to say
it. ",95
But the First Amendment is not absolute. Indeed, the carefully carved
exceptions to the rule of free speech (among them obscenity, defamation,
and fighting words), and the recognition that speech can be constitutionally
regulated by time, place, and manner restrictions, are all based on the
understanding that the First Amendment was never intended to protect all
utterances. Merely because it may be difficult to draw a line between
acceptable and nonacceptable expression, or to allocate responsibility for
deciding what speech to restrict, does not justify an absolutist approach.
In recent years there has been growing support for yet another
exception: the control of group defamation. 96 Although an effort in this
93. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
94. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory ofthe First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 87879 (1963).
95. Kenneth Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 11, 12 (1985).
96. See Scelfo v. Rutgers Univ. 282 A.2d 445,448 (N.J. 1971) ("The court in reaching its
decision enunciated certain rules regarding group defamation").
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direction has been made on college and university campuses by way of
speech and conduct codes, most of them have been too broadly drawn to
pass constitutional muster. 97 Nevertheless, some goals of such codes, civil
discourse, reasoned debate, and the exclusion of unbridled hate speech (that
which is uttered without possibility of immediate challenge), are entirely
defensible if not fundamental to the academic enterprise.
To what extent can a university constitutionally limit speech?
1. Forum Analysis
The rights and responsibilities of a public university toward outside
speakers must be analyzed according to the institution's status as a forum,
because the degree of protection for the speaker depends upon whether the
forum is (a) traditionally public, (b) public pursuant to governmental
designation, or (c) nonpublic. Traditional public forums, which generally
include "streets and parks," require that the speaker be accorded full First
Amendment rightS. 98 On the campus of a public university, surrounding
streets and sidewalks or open quadrangle areas may be considered
traditional forums. 99 Free speech is also guaranteed in non-traditional
public forums (sometimes called "limited public forums"), that is, places
made public by specific governmental designation. They have been
characterized as either "property that the State has opened for expressive
activity by all or part of the public" or a place or channel of communication
for use by the public at large for assembly and speech for use by certain
speakers or for the discussion of certain subjects. loo
Speech in non-public forums, on the other hand, may be limited, if the
disqualification or cancellation is viewpoint-neutral and otherwise
reasonable in light of the purpose of the property.101 Largely in light of the
Supreme Court's recent holding in Arkansas Educational Television
Comm 'n v Forbes, 102 a public university's auditorium is likely to qualify as
a non-public forum. The state has not created a designated public forum,
said the Court, when it has done little more "than reserve eligibility for
97. See Kenneth Lasson, Political Correctness Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit ofMinds and
Manners, 63 TENN. LAW REv. 689, 727 (1996).
98. See International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680-81
(1992).
99. See David F. McGowan and Ragesh K. Tangri, A Libertarian Critique of University
Restrictions ofOffensive Speech, 79 CAL. L. REv. 825, 914 (1991).
100. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (quoting
International SOCiety, 505 U.S. 672, 678).
101. See id. at 677-78 (internal citation omitted).
102. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
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access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members must
then, as individuals, obtain permission to use it.,,103
However, the case of Forbes, a 6-3 decision which involved a public
television station's exclusion of a state congressional candidate from a
televised debate, made it clear that even a non-traditional public forum
should be made "'generally available' to a class of speakers.,,104 The
debate in Forbes was held to have been in a nonpublic forum because it
"did not have an open-microphone fonnat.,,105 The logistics of holding an
electoral debate required the station to choose from a limited list of
speakers and to allow them all to speak on one occasion.106 The Court
noted that stations faced with the prospect of having to accommodate every
candidate, regardless of viability, might eliminate debates altogether. 107
Forbes' exclusion was because of his lack of voter support and not his
viewpoint. Moreover, his rejection was otherwise reasonable, that is, not
intended as a manipulation of the political process, and thus
constitutional. 108
Forbes should not be interpreted, therefore, as giving public
universities the right to cancel controversial speakers at will. Unlike public
television stations, public universities often choose speakers from
catalogues provided by speakers' bureaus, with hundreds of speakers to
choose from, and need accommodate no more than one at a time.
Moreover, it could well be argued that public universities have a greater
responsibility to provide diverse viewpoints than does a public television
station. 109
Indeed, such was the view of the dissenters in Forbes, who pointed
out that the station had no "narrow, objective and definite standards" upon
which to base its decision. llo They agreed with the Court of Appeals'
conclusion, that the station's appraisal of "political viability" was "so
subjective, so arguable, so susceptible of variation in individual opinion, as
to provide no secure basis for the exercise of governmental power
consistent with the First Amendment."ll1 This failure to articulate an
103. !d. at 679. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
104. Id at 678 (internal citation omitted).
105. Id at 680.
106. See id at 681.
107. See id.
108. See Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 47-48 (1983)
(holding that there was no evidence that the school district's internal mail system was not a
designated public forum, though selected speakers were able to gain access to it).
109. See discussion below on academic freedom, including the students' right to know.
110. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 693.
Ill. Id at 686 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter J., and Ginsburg J., dissenting) (quoting Forbes
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objective standard might be scrutinized more closely if the state actor were
a public university. Even if a university's auditorium qualifies as a nonpublic forum, the utterances of a guest speaker cannot be limited unless
they (a) fall into a category of unprotected speech (that is, they can be
viewed as fighting words, obscene, or defamatory, or they create a clear
and present danger); (b) are limited by reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions; or (c) cause a substantial interference with the school's
educational mission.
At least for students, a public university campus possesses many of
the characteristics of a public forum. Denial of student access to forums
for exchanging ideas would limit participation in the intellectual give-andtake of campus debate. Public students thus enjoy the rights of free speech
and association on campus, and any restriction of those rights is subject to
strict scrutiny as a prior restraint.
The First Amendment rights of students were clearly articulated by
the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dis!., 112
in which the Supreme Court held that black armbands worn by high school
pupils in protest of the war in Vietnam constituted a peaceful expression of
political opinion protected by the First Amendment. 113 Student speech can
be limited, said the Court, only where it has been determined that it
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion
of the rights of others.,,114
The Supreme Court has also established that students have a
constitutional "right to receive ideas;"lIs to associate freely;1I6 and "to
v. Arkansas Educ. Telecomm. Network Found., 93 F.3d 497,505 (8th Cir. 1996».
112. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
113. See id. at 514.
114. Id. at 513 (internal citation omitted); see also Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744,749 (5th
Cir. 1966) (public high school regulation prohibiting students from wearing buttons displaying
political messages, absent any disruption of student activities, was unconstitutional); see
generally Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see also West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding unconstitutional a school board resolution
which required all teachers and pupils to participate in the flag salute); Hammond v. South
Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947, 950 (D.C. S.C. 1967) (college rule prohibiting parades,
celebrations and demonstrations without prior approval of college authorities was a prior restraint
on students' speech and assembly rights which violated First Amendment).
115. Board. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982); see generally Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 584 (6th Cir. 1976) (decided six years earlier but
using Pico 's reasoning).
116. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972), in which the Court held that a state
college's refusal to recognize Students for a Democratic Society, a radical organization which
sometimes resorted to violence, violated the members' associational and speech rights. Neither
the school's disapproval of the group's philosophy, its failure to affirmatively deny the possibility
that they might resort to violence, mere threat of disorder, could support state abridgment of the
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inquire, to study, and to evaluate."lI7 School boards may not remove books
from school library shelves in an attempt to insure political, religious or
other orthodoxy.1I8 "[S]tudents may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate ...
[S]chool officials cannot suppress 'expressions of feeling with which they
do not wish to contend."119 They must "always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding.,,12o
The Supreme Court has also addressed the issue of whether a public
university may permissibly deny access to its facilities by a student
religious group. One particular university, which previously allowed a
religious group to conduct meetings on campus for several years, changed
its policy when informing students that religious gatherings violated a
regulation that prohibited the use of school "buildings or grounds for
purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.,,121 The Court held that
the new regulation violated the First Amendment because it prohibited the
content of religious speech without demonstrating a compelling
governmental interest to do so. The university had created a limited open
forum for the use of student groups, and therefore bore "a heavy burden of
justify[ing],,122 the exclusion of particular groupS.123
The Court went out of its way, however, to distinguish university
settings from traditional public forums like streets and parks. Decisions
regarding how best to allocate scarce resources and to fulfill the underlying
educational mission are entitled to deference. A university should not be
required, for example, to provide equal campus access to students and nonrights at issue. ld. at 183.
117. Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 603.
118. See Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 880. Justice Blackmun, concurring, said that requiring a school
board to justify its removal of a book with more than its mere dislike is a narrow principle, since
"[s]chool officials must be able to choose one book over another ... when the first book is
deemed more relevant to the curriculum, or better written, or when one of a host of other
politically neutral reasons is present." ld. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices
Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor, noted that the court had never previously recognized a
student's right to receive knowledge from school library books. See id. at 888. He noted that the
plurality's decision placed an unprecedented responsibility on the government to affIrmatively
provide the ideas in question at a particular place. See id. In his dissent, Justice Powell noted that
the right in question was unprecedented and would allow students to regularly overrule decisions
made by school boards. See id. at 893, 897 (attaching an appendix to his opinion in which he
quotes numerous passages from the banned books which would be considered "obscene" or
''vulgar'').
119. ld. at 868 (internal citation omitted).
120. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (internal citation omitted).
121. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981).
122. Id. at 268.
123. See id. at 277.
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students. More recently, however, the Court struck down a state university
regulation that denied funding to a student religious group to pay the
printing costs of its publications, holding that the rule amounted to an
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 124 Other forms of protected
expression on college campuses, such as the construction of symbolic
shanty towns, have been recognized in the lower courts. 125 Likewise,
denial of funding to gay student groups has been held to violate the First
Amendment. 126
The constitutional standards are also higher for universities than for
high schools. This rule has been established in a long line of cases which
have noted that elementary and secondary schools, unlike universities, are
designed for the "selective conveyance of ideas" and not places for "freewheeling inquiry.,,127 Nevertheless, a number of lower courts have dealt
124. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va, 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995)
(distinguishing between "content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the
purposes of [a] limited forum, and... viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed
impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations."). Id.
A federal court in Virginia addressed the issue of whether a state university, pursuant to a
regulation barring organizations that have "special interests in religious, political, and social
activities," could deny recognition of a student chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union.
See American Civil Liberties Union of Va, Inc. v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893, 894-95 n.1
(W.O. Va 1970). Non-recognition of a group did not absolutely preclude the group's use of
university facilities, but recognition guaranteed such use. The court held that the university was
compelled to grant the same recognition to the ACLU group that it had previously given other
political student organizations. See id. at 896-97. This case illustrates the importance of
university regulations (and/or litigation) that clearly enunciate educational goals and objectives to
be achieved or impaired by restricting on-campus speech.
125. Shanty towns have been recognized as protected forms of speech on college campuses,
subject to reasonable TPM restrictions. See Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660
F. Supp. 333, 337, 340 (W.O. Va 1987) (citing University of Utah Student Against Apartheid v.
Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200, 1211 (D. Utah 1986), which held that erection of shanties was First
Amendment protected symbolic speech, but that the university requirement that they be removed
at night in the interests of campus safety was a reasonable time, place and manner restriction; and
holding that UVA's lawn use regulations precluding shanty construction, a form of symbolic
speech protected by the First Amendment, did not meet the 0 'Brien standard).
126. See Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 368 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting
that ''the [Gay and Lesbian Students Association] does not advocate sodomy, and, even if it did,
its speech about an illegal activity would still be protected by the First Amendment. People may
extol the virtues of arson or even cannibalism. They simply may not commit the acts.") [d.
Consider, however, that the quoted passage may overstate the law: Extolling the virtues of arson
may cause a material disruption, or create a clear and present danger that a listener will follow the
speaker's advice.
127. Pico, 457 U.S. at 915; (Rehnquist, J.,joined by Burger, C.J., and Powell, J., dissenting);
see Cary v. Board of Education of the Adams-Arapahoe Sch. Dist. 28-J, 598 F.2d 535, 539-540
(10th Cir. 1979) (noting that most of the Supreme Court cases on academic freedom involve
institutions of higher learning, distinguishing the Court's opinions on secondary schools);
Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass. 1971) (noting that speech rights of
secondary school teachers are probably less than those of university professors, that secondary
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with secondary-school regulations requiring review of all non-school
publications prior to their distribution on campus, most of which have been
struck down as unconstitutional prior restraints. 128 But a student's right to
free expression is far from absolute. An otherwise protected speech which
interferes with the inculcation of "fundamental values," even if it is not
physically disruptive, may nevertheless be prohibited. 129 Similarly, the
state may limit the exposure of minors to speech which is indecent but not
necessarily obscene. 130
Likewise, a state university may deny recognition to a socialist
student organization upon finding the group advocated the overthrow of
established institutions by violent methods. I3I A Florida court upheld a
university'S denial of recognition, stating the university presented ample
evidence that recognition would threaten the school's educational goals and
"constituted an imminently present threat" to order on campus.I32 The
court further stressed that the administration's findings were neither vague
nor indirect, but were based on documented evidence that the national
socialist organization seeking university recognition advocated violent
disruption as a way to achieve its goals. 133
school acts in loco parentis, and that secondary teachers are usually less educated and often less
mature than professors); but see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 521-22 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (implying that there is no distinction between the rights
of college students and students below the college level in state-run schools, and that the state has
broad power to limit the rights of both; and citing Waugh v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of
Mississippi, 237 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1915) in which the Court held constitutional a state law
barring students from peaceably assembling in Greek letter fraternities.); see also Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 285-288 (1988) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., and
Blackrnun, J., dissenting) (implying that the First Amendment rights of high school students are
virtually the same as those of college students or even adults).
128. See Bright v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 556 P.2d 1090, 1100 (Cal. 1976); see
generally In re Jordan, 500 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1972); Morris v. Williams, 433 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1967)
(en banc).
129. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding that a high
school student's suspension, caused by his use of graphic sexual metaphor in a nominating speech
made before the school body did not violate his First Amendment rights).
130. Pico, 457 U.S. at 870 (in which all members of the Court recognized that the school
board had authority to remove books that were vulgar); see also Thomas v. Board of Educ.,
Granville Central Sch. Dist., 607 F2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that "the First
Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not
Cohen's jacket"); Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749
(1978) (stating "[a]lthough Cohen's written message might have been incomprehensible to a first
grader, Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant.) Id.; Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633 (1968) (upholding a New York statute which banned the sale of
sexuality oriented material to minors).
131. See Merkey v. Board of Regents, 344 F. Supp. 1296, 1307 (N.D. Fla. 1972).
132. See id. &t 1306.
133. See id. at 1302.
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Students' expressive rights have been similarly limited in school
newspaper cases. The Supreme court has stated that a principal's refusal to
allow two articles to be published in a high school paper did not violate the
First Amendment because the paper was a nonpublic forum, which "might
be reasonably perceived to bear the imprimatur of the school,,134 and
therefore subjected to a standard "reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concems.,,135
Faculty members have similar limitations. For example, a professor
who sued the University of Massachusetts for ordering his controversial art
display to be removed from the student union building was not allowed to
claim First Amendment protection. The exhibit included detailed nude
paintings with controversial titles, including paintings of nude adolescents.
A federal appeals court rejected the plaintiff's claim that his art constituted
political or social speech: Plaintiff's constitutional interest was held to be
minimal in that "freedom of speech must recognize, at least within limits,
freedom not to listen.,,136
Outsiders seeking a forum on campus operate under similar rules.
134. Hazlewood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
135. Id at 273. Note that this is similar to the standard applied in cases involving the First
Amendment rights of prisoners, where the current test is whether the speech is "reasonably
related to legitimate penological concerns." Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1986);
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 409 (1989). In Hazelwood, Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, wrote a noteworthy dissent, in which he argued that Tinker's
"material disruption" standard was appropriate in this case, and that the principal's actions failed
that standard. Student expression, said Brennan, is bound to conflict with the state's pedagogical
functions, but that "mere incompatibility with the school's pedagogical message" was not
constitutionally sufficient justification for the suppression of student speech. Brennan further
noted that the Court has never intimated a distinction between personal and school-sponsored
speech. See Hazlewood, 484 U.S. at 280-82 (citing Papish v. University of Missouri Board of
Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 671 n.l (1973) (per curiam) (holding unconstitutional a University's
expUlsion of a student for lewd expression in an off-campus newspaper she sold on-campus
pursuant to university authorization»; see also Healy, 408 U.S. at 195-196. However, both
Papish and Healy involved speech on college campuses.
The distinction between non-school-sponsored student speech and that which may bear the
school's "imprimatur" was used to uphold a high-school principal's decision to abandon the
school's "Johnny Reb" mascot in Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801, 802 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that a principal was justified in eliminating a "Johnny Reb" mascot, after receiving
complaints that black students and parents found it offensive); see Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d
1149 (9th Cir. 1988) (striking down a school regulation requiring submission and approval of
non-school sponsored publications before they could be distributed on campus in).
136. Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988,989-91 (1970); 400 U.S. 903 (1970) cert. denied. Close
may be distinguished from other free-speech cases in that the people viewing the artwork
probably did not come to the forum for that purpose, and therefore would not have wanted to
view it if given the choice. Further, the rights of involuntary viewers to be protected from this
"offensive" material superseded a faculty member's right to express himself on campus, even
though he had been invited to do so by an official.
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Thus, extracurricular organizations, such as the ACLU, have been granted
standing to assert the right of its student members to form a chapter on a
college campus. "[W]hile it might be constitutional for a state university to
deny use of its facilities to all outside speakers, it is clearly unconstitutional
to allow some outside speakers to use facilities but to deny their use to
speakers who are controversial or considered undesirable by the college
administration, board of trustees, or state legislature.,,137 Just as students
and faculty at public universities do not enjoy an absolute right to free
expression, regardless of the consequences of certain speech, university
officials do not have absolute power to arbitrarily censor on-campus speech
by outside speakers. 138
Although it is not likely that a public university would adopt a policy
of disallowing all outside speakers from speaking on campus, if such a
policy is deemed best for the institution's educational goals, it can
constitutionally do so. On the other hand, public universities cannot allow
some outside speakers and disallow others without a narrowly drawn
justification, as such a practice is deemed an unconstitutional prior restraint
on the right of students and faculty to hear certain speakers. Such prior
restraints on speech are presumed unconstitutional unless the restraint is
"narrowly drafted so as to suppress only that speech which presents a 'clear
and present danger' of resulting in serious substantive evil which a
university has the right to prevent.,,139
An unconstitutional prior restraint was found when a university barred
the guest of a recognized student group to speak on campus because he
might advocate breaking the law and because he was a convicted felon. 140
The university had no official outside speaker regulations in effect at the
time, and the president based his decision on merely a "philosophical
concept." The court ruled that the principal's decision was "blatant
political censorship," and that his guidelines constituted unconstitutional
prior restraints on speech.141 Similarly, a college administrator's attempt to

137. American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Inc, v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893,
896 (W.D. Va 1970).
138. See Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 970 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (invalidating
unconstitutionally vague outside speaker regulations applicable to all universities in the State of
Mississippi ).
139. Id. at 971 (internal citation omitted). The "clear and present danger test," first enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927), is satisfied only where
a proper authority finds that "immediate serious violence (or other substantive evil) was to be
expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such
advocacy was then contemplated." Id.
140. See Brooks v. Auburn University, 296 F. Supp. 188, 191 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
141. Id at 188, 191, 196. The court also held that Auburn could not allocate funds to pay
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sanction a student/faculty organization for inviting controversial speakers
to campus was struck down. The court held the president's conclusion that
the speakers' militant views "would be apt to exacerbate the tensions
between the College and the community [and to] provoke discussions
between students" was insufficient to quell the speech at issue. 142 Fear of
campus disturbances is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression, since many types of discussions among students can cause
disruptions. 143
In determining whether a university is to be considered public or
private, courts are also called upon to decide whether its actions are fairly
attributable to the state. l44 Because private universities are generally not
considered state actors, they are held to a lower standard of constitutional
scrutiny and a lesser obligation to ensure a student's First Amendment
rights. 145 The Supreme Court first recognized this proposition in RendellBaker v. Kohn,146 in which a teacher at a private school for sociallymaladjusted high school students had been discharged after supporting a
student petition for greater participation in decision-making. Five other
teachers who complained about their colleague's dismissal were likewise
discharged. All six filed claims alleging violations of their rights under the
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The court held that even though
the school received public funds and performed a public function, its

some speakers, then withhold payment for other speakers without constitutional justification. See
id. at 198. See also Committee for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1519 (10th
Cir. 1992) (intimating that the defendant university which refused to allow "The Last Temptation
of Christ" to be screened on campus was likely to lose on the merits). For an exhaustive analysis
of outside publication cases, see Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1152-59 (1987).
142. Pickings v. Bruce, 430 F.2d 595,600 (8th Cir. 1970).
143. See id.
144. See Frank 1. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: The Case ofPornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REv. 291, 306 (1989).
[T]he [state action] doctrine holds that although someone may have suffered harmful
treatment of a kind that one might ordinarily describe as a deprivation of liberty or a
denial of equal protection of the laws, that occurrence excites no constitutional
concern unless the proximate active perpetrators of the harm include persons
exercising the special authority or power of the government of a state.

Id.
145. See Evan G. S. Siegel, Comments, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The
Regulation of Offensive Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1382-1387
(1990).
146. 457 U.S. 830 (1982); see generally Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (determining
that a private nursing home was not a state actor despite being heavily funded and regulated by
the state); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil. Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (recognizing that the party
charged with a constitutional deprivation must be fairly characterized as a state actor.)

70

ST. THOMASLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 12

discharge of the teacher was not the result of any state regulation and must
therefore be honored. The private school's relationship with the state was
likened to that of a private contractor and its client: There is no "symbiotic
relationship" between the two. 147
In order for constitutional rights to be asserted against a private
university, a showing must be made that "state action" is involved. 148 The
mere fact that a private university'S mission may be to educate members of
the public does not by itself fulfill this function. Absent state action, a
university may regulate speech as it sees fit because constitutional rights
can only be infringed by the government. 149 Generally, state action is
found where three conditions occur: (1) the state and the private entity
maintain an interdependent relationship; (2) the state requires, encourages,
or is otherwise significantly involved in nominally private conduct; and (3)
the private entity exercises a traditional state function. Governmental
regulation of a private college, or even substantial contribution of financial
support, does not alone constitute state action.
Unfortunately, courts have been neither clear nor uniform in the
distinctions they draw between private and public universities. For
example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that although Princeton
University is a private institution, it could still be obligated to protect free
speech. Princeton had sought to evict someone from its campus for
distributing political literature without a permit. The court held that the
state constitution, which expressly forbade government from abridging the
right of speech and assembly, should be applied to private universities
147. Some commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court modified its holding in
Rendell-Baker with its subsequent ruling in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983), which suggests that "private colleges, like private persons, are always free to advocate or
endorse heinous doctrines, even if they are contrary to contemporary morality or constitutional
law." William Shaun Alexander, Regulating Speech on Campus: A Plea/or Tolerance, 26 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 1349, 1362 (1991). But Bob Jones says no such thing, holding simply that the
Establishment Clause has not been violated when tax benefits granted to a religious university are
withheld because the institution failed to observe the "fundamental public policy" of nondiscrimination as required by federal statute (even if its actions were taken pursuant to religious
belie!). While this holding might appear to characterize the school's discriminatory practices as
government related, the words "state action" are never mentioned in the case. Moreover, Bob
Jones is otherwise too distinguishable to be treated as a modification of Rendell-Baker: There was
no speech issue raised; the school's actions were clearly covered by a federal statute, as
interpreted by an IRS Revenue Ruling in spite of the institution's private status; and the Court, if
it had found for the university, would have been undermining its oft-articulated position that
equal treatment of all races is fundamental public policy. See generally Bob Jones 461 U.S. 574
(1983).
148. See Counts v. Voorhees College, 312 F. Supp. 598, 607-08 (D. S.C. 1970).
149. See Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 656 F. Supp. 1045, 1051 (W.O. Ark.
1987).
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through the state's police power. It thus found that Princeton's permit
regulation was unconstitutional, in that it was not based on any specific
standards at the university for limiting expression. 150 Further, the court
noted that because the mission of both private and public universities is the
same- education- a wide disparity in expressive freedoms between the two
types of colleges "would seem anomalous and undesirable." Thus, it
concluded, "the differences between public and private educational
institutions may, in many situations, be negligible.,,151
The activities of private universities may likewise be considered state
action if the federal or state government is heavily involved in subsidizing
or running the institution. For example, when a group of employees
maintained that Temple University, an otherwise private university, had
violated their civil rights by wrongfully terminating them, the District
Court found state action on the part of the university because of its intimate
relationship with governmental entities. Although a university does not
become a state actor merely because it has a charter from the state, Temple
University was incorporated by statute into the Pennsylvania education
system, there were state-appointed members on Temple's board of trustees,
and the university received significant state subsidies. 152
An argument can also be made that a private institution may become a
state actor if it performs some public function or opens the campus to the
public. By inviting the public to attend concerts, lectures, films and
sporting events, the private university creates a public forum, where First
Amendment freedoms are protected. "The more an owner, for his
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more
do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional

150. See State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 632-33 (N.J. 1980). The Schmid case contains a
thorough analysis of other cases pertaining to constitutional freedoms and private property in
general.
151. The Court stated that although Princeton
is involved in a continuous relationship with the State ... [it] is a stateaccredited educational institution; it participates in and receives... the
advantages of certain State programs . .. Its property and buildings on the
central campus with the exception of its ice skating and hockey facility and
its campus parking lots, are tax-exempt. [It] also receives state-budgeted
funds ... [It] is, indisputably, predominantly private, unregulated and
autonomous in its character and functioning as an institution of higher
education.
/d. at 621.

152. See Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473, 478 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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rights of those who use it.,,153
In 1991 Congress attempted to enable private university students to
obtain injunctive relief if the school "[made] or [enforced] any rule
subjecting any student to disciplinary sanctions solely on the basis of
conduct that is speech or other communication protected [by the First
Amendment].,,154 The Collegiate Speech Protection Act, which was
endorsed by the American Civil Liberties Union, would have allowed
students at private educational institutions receiving federal funds to
challenge campus conduct codes on First Amendment grounds. The bill
did not pass. ISS
Public schools, in contrast, are viewed with considerably more
stringent constitutional scrutiny. 156 They must abide by three general
principles of free speech. First, speech cannot be banned because of its
content. 157 Second, even the expression of odious ideas must be
protected. 158 And third, the academic setting presupposes a heightened
commitment to First Amendment principles. 159 Thus on a state university
campus, the mere dissemination of ideas, no matter how offensive to good
153. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
154. See William Kimsey, Fighting Restrictive Codes on Campus, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 13,
1992, at E4.
155. See Hyde and Fishman, supra note 15, at 1493. The legislation would have provided the
following:
(a)

A postsecondary educational institution that is a program or activity shall not
make or enforce any rule subjecting any student to disciplinary sanctions solely
on the basis of conduct that is speech or other communication protected from
governmental restriction by the first article of amendment to the Constitution of
the United States; (b) Whoever is a student at an educational institution engaged
in a violation of subsection (a) may, in a civil action, obtain appropriate
injunctive and declaratory relief ... (c) This section does not apply to an
educational institution that is controlled by a religious organization, to the extent
that the application of this section would not be consistent with the religious
tenets of such organization.

fd. at 1493-94. In 1992 the California legislature amended the state's education code to guarantee
students the same First Amendment rights on campus that they have elsewhere. CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 94367 (West 1992). The law applies to public and private colleges and universities, with
a narrow exception for schools operated by religious denominations. Students can sue for
infringement of their free speech rights. Civil recovery is limited to court costs and attorney's
fees. This section has been upheld in various cases involving California State University,
Northridge, Occidental College, and Stanford University.
156. See infra Section II.C.
157. See Police Dept' of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
158. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,24-25
(1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593 (1969); see also Stephen W. Gard, Fighting
Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 547-48 (1980).
159. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
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taste, "may not be shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of
decency.",160 The university is generally in a better position if it has an
established policy against unprotected categories of speech, rather than
having to attack them on an ad hoc basis.
2. Unprotected Utterances
To issue a prior restraint, that is, to cancel a speech before it is
delivered, a public university must show that a breach of the peace is
virtually certain to occur by virtue of the speaker's advocacy of violence. 161
Past instances of violence associated with a particular speaker may also
justify a cancellation. Generally, however, a public university would have
to wait until the inflammatory words have been uttered and have been
determined to create a clear and present danger or a substantial threat that
violence will ensue. 162
Regulation of expression that incites imminent lawless action is
permissible. The Supreme Court has drawn the distinction between "mere
advocacy," for which the government cannot punish, and inciting a group
to violence, which it can constitutionally limit. 163 But the Court has strictly
interpreted this standard, requiring a careful consideration of the facts and
circumstances surrounding such expression. Thus, universities must
narrowly tailor policies to ensure that regulation prohibits only imminent,
unlawful incitement to action, the definition and application of which can
be difficult. 164
Even if a university has a constitutionally sound prohibition against
"fighting words" (an improbable proposition), it would not be able to
prevent a speaker from uttering insults at his audience. The Supreme Court
has held that "fighting words," which "by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," are not communication
but instruments of assault, and therefore are not entitled to First
Amendment protection. 165 Such words do not promote "any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
160. Papish v. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (refusing to
suppress offensive words is a "central test" of commitment to free speech).
161. Advocacy alone cannot be prohibited. See Brooks, 412 F.2d at 1173 (internal citation
omitted).
162. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969); see also Healy, 408 U.S. at 192.
163. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 (1969).
164. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407.
165. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Chap/ins/..y involved a
defendant who was arrested after calling the city marshall a "[g]od damned racketeer" and a
"damned [f]ascist." Id. at 569.
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that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality.,,166 But the Court has narrowly construed this
doctrine. 167
In Beauharnais v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment does not protect statements which defame specific groupS.168
Though the Court subsequently limited the group-libel exception when it
decided that public officials had to prove actual malice in order to recover
for libel, stating that First Amendment freedoms required such restrictions
and underscoring the notion that political speech is to be protected under
the First Amendment,169 it has never explicitly overruled Beauharnais.
Group-libel should thus remain a viable action. 170 Thus it is open to
question whether broad university regulations that penalize group libel (for
example, a prohibition on the distribution of racist or anti-Semitic
publications) would be held unconstitutional as protected political speech.
It is likewise well established that when the interest in prohibiting the
expression outweighs the need for the speaker to disseminate his message,
it may be limited by fairly applied time, place, and manner restrictions,
provided that there is an alternative forum available and the regulation is
content-neutral. l7l
For example, if a controversial speaker was
inadvertently scheduled to appear during a university's final examination
period, in derogation of an established policy prohibiting such appearances
at that time, cancellation of the speech would in all likelihood be
166. Id. at 572; see Thomas F. Shea, Don't Bother to Smile When You Call Me That"Fighting Words and the First Amendment, 63 Ky. L.J. 1,22 (1975). The fighting-words doctrine,
which requires that there be a "one-on-one, face-to-face" confrontation is arguably obsolete, since
the Supreme Court hasn't upheld any laws prohibiting fighting words since Chaplinsky. See, e.g.,
Gooding, Warden v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 537 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that
"the Court ... is merely paying lip service to Chaplinsky.").
167. See Punishing Racist Speech, I SYNTIffiSIS: L. AND POL'y IN HIGHER EDUC. 3 (1989). In
some post-Chaplinsky cases, the Court has refused to classify the challenged speech as fighting
words. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) and Bachellar v. Maryland, 397
U.S. 564,567 (1970). In other cases where the doctrine was arguably applicable, the Court has
reversed lower court decisions based on overbreadth of laws rather than for failure to meet the
"fighting words" standard. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) and Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1971).
168. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251, 266-67 (1952).
169. See generally New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1992).
170. See Kenneth Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech: When Big Brother Should Butt
In, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 77, 110 (1984).
171. See Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d. 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1969); see generally
University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Utah 1986);
Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 974 (N.D. Miss. 1969). (stating that the court "[sees] no
objection to the university's requirement that preference be given to an academic event over an
invitation to a guest speaker sought to be scheduled at the same time."). Id.
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constitutional. l72 While speech itself cannot advocate violence, neither may
it be silenced by those in the audience. The prohibition against a "heckler's
veto," acceding to an audience's demand that the speaker be halted, is
based on the generally-accepted presumption against attributing the
creation of a "clear and present danger" to the speaker. 173
But this principle appears to conflict with the "substantial interference
doctrine;" perhaps the most concrete criterion upon which controversial
speech on campus may be constitutionally regulated. This standard, first
promulgated by the Fifth Circuit in Brooks v. Auburn University,174
suggests that even if no clear and present danger could be demonstrated, a
university might be able to cancel a speaker who is likely to create a
"material disruption.,,175 Such a disruption may occur when a controversial
speaker is shouted down, regardless of who (speaker or heckler) is silenced
or ousted. 176
3. Speech Codes
As noted earlier many universities, both public and private, have
responded to the increasing amount of campus incivility by formulating
speech and conduct codes. 177 A typical code defines harassment to include
any conduct, verbal or physical, on or off campus, which creates an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive educational, work, or living environment,
and is premised on the ideas that (a) while freedom of expression is
essential in a university, so is freedom from unreasonable and disruptive
offense; and (b) it is usually easier to deal with such questions if one thinks

172. The school would probably have to show that students did actually use the auditorium for
studying, and it would probably have to arrange for him to speak at another site on campus, or
reschedule his appearance at a later time.
173. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
174. 412 F.2d 1171 (1969).
175. Id at 1173; see Phillips v. Anderson County Sch. Dist. Five, 987 F. Supp. 488, 492-93
(D.S.C. 1997) (holding that, based on "material disruption" standard, a middle school was
justified in prohibiting student from wearing jacket made to look like a Confederate battle flag, in
view of past disruptive incidents resulting from students wearing garments which depicted the
Confederate flag); Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Or. 1976) (holding that school
board's absolute prohibition of political speakers at a local high school was unreasonable where
"no disruptions had occurred in [the teacher's] classes, or at any other school gatherings where
political subjects were discussed" and "none were expected in the future.") Id. at 1364; but see
Healy, 408 U.S. 169, 185, 190-91 (mere threat of disorder insufficient to justify university's
refusal to enfranchise its SDS chapter).
176. Under First Amendment jurisprudence, it would likely be required to silence the hecklers
and allow the speaker to continue, provided that his speech is otherwise protected.
177. One observer notes some 700 colleges and universities had enacted hate speech codes by
1995. See Schweitzer, supra note 85, at 508 nA8.
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in terms of interests rather than rights. 178
The movement to enforce civility on campus has been called the most
successful effort in American history to restrict offensive speech. 179
Perhaps that is why universities promulgating such codes have been
undeterred by the fact that not one of them has been found constitutional.
Among the most notable university codes to be overturned to date have
been those at three major universities: Michigan, Wisconsin and
Stanford. 180
The University of Michigan's policy was the first to go before the
courts. The test case arose out of a series of racist incidents on campus in
the winter of 1987, beginning with the distribution of racist pamphlets
declaring "open season" on African-Americans, referring to them as
"saucer lips, porch monkeys, andjigaboos." A week later some racist jokes
were broadcast on the campus radio station. When students demonstrated
against these incidents, a student displayed a Ku Klux Klan uniform from a
dormitory window. The administration quickly took action in the form of a
statement from the president of the university expressing outrage at the
events, and reaffirming the University of Michigan's dedication to
maintaining a racially, ethnically, and culturally diverse campus. The state
legislature held a public hearing on racism. At the same time, students
formed a "United Coalition Against Racism" and threatened to file a classaction suit against the university for failing to maintain a nonracist
environment on campus. 181
By the following spring, the University of Michigan's regents had
adopted a student code of conduct. Its Policy on Discrimination and
Discriminatory Harassment l82 prohibited any behavior (verbal or physical)
that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual for physical, racial, or social
characteristics beyond his control. Such behavior would include any
"express or implied threat to an individual's academic efforts, employment,
participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal
safety; or .... [c]reat[ing] an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning
environment for educational pursuits, employment or participation in
University sponsored extra-curricular activities.,,183
178. See, e.g., Stephen Fleischer, Campus Speech Codes: The Threat to Liberal Education, 27
J. MARsH. L.R. 709, 738-48 (1994) (discussing affects ofcoIIegiate speech codes).
179. See Lasson, supra note 97, at 733.
180. See id at 727.
181. See John Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 854 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
182. [d.
183. [d. at 856. A black female law student called another student ''white trash" and was
charged with violating the University of Michigan harassment rule. She ultinIately agreed to
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Interestingly, the Michigan code divided the university into three
speech zones: public areas, where only physical acts would be restricted;
residence halls, where speech and conduct were governed by language in
the room leases; and educational facilities (including libraries), where the
university sought to regulate speech that discriminated "on the basis of
race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, ~reed, national origin,
ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status."I84
The university policy was challenged by a graduate student in
biopsychology, who argued that it infringed on his freedom to teach;
specifically, that it would hamper his discussion of the biological roots of
individual differences in personality traits and mental abilities. He believed
that some of the theories, because they espoused genetic and biological
factors as major contributors to individual differences presented, could be
perceived as sexist or racist under the code. 18s
In 1989, a federal judge struck down the Michigan policy as an
unconstitutional restriction on free speech, finding it to be vague and
overbroad because "the terms stigmatize and victimize are not selfdefining" and "can only be understood with reference to some exogenous
value system.,,186 The court also took issue with the university in that its
code sought to prohibit "certain speech because it disagreed with the ideas
or messages sought to be conveyed. . . [It]was essentially making up the
rules as it went along.,,187 In short, the university could not proscribe
speech "simply because it was found to be offensive, even gravely so, by
large numbers of people.,,188 The court commented further on the tension
brought to bear in speech codes between free speech and equal protection,
and making clear its feeling that the First Amendment took precedence
over the Fourteenth. 189
Two years later, Wisconsin's speech code was likewise declared
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The policy covered "racist or
discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive behavior directed at
an individual," where those comments "demean the race, sex, religion,
color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age
of the individual or individuals, "and" [c]reate an intimidating, hostile or
write a fonnal letter of apology to settle the charge. American Civil Liberties Union Briefing
Paper Number 16 (1996) <http://www.achLol-glJibralyi}lbp16lrtml>.
184. John Doe, 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989); See MARcus, supra note 10, at 124.
185. See John Doe at 858.
186. ld. at 859.
187. ld. at 868.
188. ld at 863.
189. See id. at 868.
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demeaning environment for education, or other university-authorized
activity. 190 The Wisconsin code was much clearer and more narrowly
drafted than that of the University of Michigan. First, it applied only to
direct attacks on an individual. Second, it included illustrative examples,
such as calling someone an offensive name, placing demeaning material in
someone's living quarters, and destroying property. Third, the university
issued to students and faculty an explanatory pamphlet, including detailed
classroom and non-classroom examples, applying the policy to the facts of
each example, and concluding with whether the expression would be
subject to the university's code. 191
The Wisconsin code was applied in a number of specific incidents
involving fraternities. A student who called another student "Shakazulu"
was placed on probation, ordered to consult with an alcohol abuse
counselor, and required to plan a project to help sensitize himself to the
issue of diversity.
A student was also placed on probation for
impersonating an immigration official and demanding to see the
immigration documents of a Turkish-American student. A student was
placed on probation and required to get treatment for alcohol abuse for
telling an Asian-American student that "[i]t's people like you that's the
reason this country is screwed Up.,,192 A student was placed on probation
and required to perform community service for yelling at a woman and
calling her a "fucking bitch.,,193 Another student was suspended for calling
a residence hall staffer a "South American immigrant.,,194 While it had
been more carefully drafted than the Michigan policy, the Wisconsin code
was nevertheless found unconstitutional 195 The university, which was one
of the first to ban racial and sexual slurs on campus, first attempted to
redraw its code more narrowly, but later dropped in entirely in 1992. 196
Perhaps the most surprising code to fail was Stanford's, a set of rules
which carefully sought to avoid any chilling effect on the debate of
sensitive topics by forbidding only fighting words linked to sex and race.
In 1988, after two white students defaced a poster at a black theme house
with racial caricatures, Stanford had enacted a hate speech regulation which

190. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of University of Wis. System, 774 F. Supp. 1163,
1165 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
191. See id at I 165-66.
192. Id at 1167.
193. Id.
194. Id
195. See id at 1177.
196. See id
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banned insults based on sex or race. 197 In 1994, ten students filed suit,
claiming that Stanford's rule (entitled "Fundamental Standard
Interpretation: Free Expression and Discriminatory Harassment") violated
the California Educational Code, the California Constitution, and the U.S.
Constitution, arguing that it was a "content-based, view point
discriminatory, prior restrahlt on speech." A lower state court agreed, on
the grounds that the code inhibited free speech: "Stanford cannot proscribe
speech that merely hurts the feelings of those who hear it.,,198 The ruling
was the first time a speech code at a private university had been held
invalid. 199

B. NOTIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
1. Precepts
The concept of academic freedom, a First Amendment subtext
through which scholars generally invoke an enhanced notion of free-speech
rights,200 can trace its history as far back as Plato's Apology, in which
Socrates defended his right to discuss controversial topics with others,
regardless of whether those in power may have found them unacceptable. 201
Yet even Socrates felt constrained by certain moral and religious principles,
which were subsequently reflected in the curriculum of the great early
197. See Bill Workman, Ban on Hate Speech Struck Down/Judge Rules Stanford Code is too
Broad, San Francisco Chronicle, Chronicle Peninsula Bureau (Mar. 2, 1995)
<http://joc.mit.eduldocslstanford.ban.struck.down.htm>.
198. Ben Wildavsky, First Amendment vs. Anti-Hate Efforts: Rethinking Campus Speech
Codes, San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 4, 1995, at AI. Stanford's code had been crafted by
Thomas Grey, a law professor highly sensitive to First Amendment principles. See id
199. See id For a detailed summary of the speech code test cases at Michigan, Wisconsin,
and Stanford, see MARcus, supra note 10, at 122-129. George Mason University's code is also
discussed therein.
200. This article primarily addresses the speech rights of outsiders who appear by invitation at
public colIeges and universities. Some such speakers may simultaneously be employed as
professors on other campuses. However it is not generally held that a professor's academic
freedom at his home campus is carried with him whenever he appears elsewhere. For a more
thorough treatment of this issue, see ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE: A HANDBOOK OF THE
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 35-36 (L. Joughin ed., 1969)
(recognizing professors' rights to full freedom in research, in classroom teaching, and to speak or
write outside the classroom free from censorship or discipline by their employing institution); see
also Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces ofAcademic Freedom, 32 Loy. L. REV. 831 (1987); Steven R.
Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right ofPublic School Teachers to Determine What They
Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1976); and Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81
HARv. L. REv. 1045 (1968).
201. See Irwin Polishook, Academic Freedom and Academic Contexts, 15 PACE L. REV. 141,
142 (1994).

80

ST. THOMAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

universities. 202 For example, any dissent from the Articles of the Church of
England was prohibited at Oxford and Cambridge.203 Similar limitations on
academic freedom continued into the late nineteenth century, when
professors at American colleges and universities were dismissed for such
offenses as "advocated free trade and greenbacks," participating in a
Populist convention, speaking out against monopolies, favoring free silver,
opposing imperialism, and delivering a pro-labor speech.204
A concerted effort to change the state of affairs came with the
creation of the American Association of University Professors in 1915.
"Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and
not to further the interest of either the individual teacher . . . or the
institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for
truth and its free exposition." So begins the AAUP's fIrst Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure. 205 Academic freedom is
deemed essential to these purposes, and applies to teaching, research, and
learning. Tenure is a means to both freedom of teaching and research and
to "a sufficient degree of economic security to make the profession
attractive to men and women of ability.,,206
SpecifIcally, academic freedom means that the teacher is entitled to
full freedom in research and in the publication of its results, subject to the
adequate performance of his other academic duties, as well as to freedom in
the classroom in discussing his subject. "But {he] should be carefol not to
introduce into {his] teaching controversial matter which has no relation to
{his] subject.,,207 "Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or
202. See id
203. See id
204. Id. at 143.
205. \VALTER METzGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN TIlE AGE OF TIlE UNIVERSITY, 146 (1955);
see also Polishook, supra note 2021, at 142. A declaration on academic freedom was first
endorsed by the AAUP at its Second Annual meeting in 1916. In 1940, representatives of the
Association of American Colleges and the American Association of University professors agreed
upon a "Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure," and upon three attached
"Interpretations." The 1940 Statement, and its Interpretations, were endorsed by the two
associations in 1941. In subsequent years endorsement has been officially voted by numerous
other organizations. The 1990 edition of AAUP's Red Book lists 143 endorsers, including many
professional disciplinary associations, as well as the Association of American Law Schools, the
American Council of Learned Societies, and the American Association of Higher Education.
206. American Association of Univ. Professors, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments <http://www.aaup.orglI940stat.htm>.
207. See id at Academic Freedom (b)2 (emphasis supplied). As an AAUP editor's note points
out, some courses of study require consideration of matter on which the teacher is not in all
aspects expert; thus the teacher of English composition or literature may have to deal with
writings about race relations, sexual mores, or social philosophy. A teacher handling mixed
responsibilities of this type ordinarily indicates the limits of his expert judgment, and should not
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other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time
of the appointment. ,,208
The college or university teacher is regarded as "a citizen, a member
of a learned profession, and an officer of an educational institution." When
speaking or writing, the teacher should thus be free from institutional
censorship or discipline. But his special position in the community
imposes special obligations. As a person of learning and an educational
officer, he should remember that the public may judge his profession and
his institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be accurate,
should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions
of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is not a
spokesman for the institution.209
Like the First Amendment, however, academic freedom is not
absolute. This was recognized at length by the first Declaration of
Principles in 1915, which provided that there are no rights without
corresponding duties.210 The claim to freedom of teaching is made in the
interest of the integrity and progress of scientific inquiry. The liberty of the
scholar to set forth his conclusions is conditioned upon their being the
fruits of "competent, patient and sincere inquiry," which are set forth with
"dignity, courtesy, and temperateness oflanguage.,,211 While the university
teacher need not withhold his own opinions in controversial matters, he
should be a person of "fair and judicial mind," and offer "without
suppression or innuendo, the divergent opinions of other investigators.,,212
A professor should cause his students "to become familiar with the best
public expressions of the great historic types of doctrine upon the questions
at issue.,,213 Above all, he should remember that his business is not to give
students "ready-made conclusions, but to train them to think for
themselves, and to provide them access to those materials which they need
if they are to think intelligently."214 In short, there is a balance to strike

be subject to particular scrutiny because he may deal with controversial issues.
208. Problems sometimes arise through the failure of an institution to be explicit about its
particular limitations at the time of appointing a teacher, or the failure of a teacher to observe
limitations which he has accepted short of waiver of his fundamental academic obligations. Id.
209. See ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE: A HANDBOOK OF TIlE AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, supra note 200, at 36. An issue has also arisen
regarding the right to silence or, conversely, the obligation of disclosure.
210. See General Report of the Committee of Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure
(1915), reprinted in 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 393 at 393, app. A401 (1990).
211. Id. at 401.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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between the right of the individual to free speech and the right of others to
be protected from it. Violations of such academic responsibilities by
professors who do not state the truth as they see it, develop and improve
their scholarly competence, exercise critical self-discipline and judgment in
using and transmitting knowledge, and act as intellectual guides and
counselors may be looked upon as abuses of academic freedom rather than
its exercise.
Academic freedom also forbids use of the classroom for political
advocacy or indoctrination, for defamation, or in efforts to incite violence.
A professor can be constrained from discussing material irrelevant to his
assigned subject matter; from using abusive or profane language; from
discriminating against students or colleagues on the basis of their race,
religion, gender, or viewpoints; and from violating current standards of
decency and civility.215 The more difficult cases of academic freedom
involve incendiary speakers whose agenda are arguably motivated by
bigotry and have little educational value.
But under the standards articulated above, one would struggle to
invoke academic freedom as a defense to the rantings of Khalid
Muhammad. Nor, for that matter, would they seem to justifY questionable
academic programs. For example, the conference on "Revolting Behavior"
sponsored in 1997 by the State University of New York at New Paltz,
which featured the sale of sex toys and instruction on sado-masochism and
masturbation, might arguably be outside the protection of AAUP
guidelines. 216
2. Jurisprudence
As noted earlier, the leading case regarding academic freedom is
Keyishian v. Board ojRegents,217 in which the Supreme Court declared:
Our Nation is deeply conunitted to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom.
"The vigilant protection of
215. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND TIlE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 7 (1993).
216. The conference also featured a presentation by a "performance artist" who dressed as a
Hasidic Jew, was beaten with a whip, made to crawl on his hands and knees, during which he was
subjected to an act of (simulated) sodomy. "[A]cademic freedom ... will not long last if it is spat
upon in this fashion. The academy is supposed to be a refuge from ignorance and bigotry.
[SUNY] has used a public trust to promote deviancy and lew-hatred." Anti-Semitism at New
Paltz, N.Y. POST, Feb. 10, 1998, at 26.
217. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools. .. The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace
of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
"out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection.,,218

The Court later embellished upon its holding in Keyishian: ~'To
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and
universities would imperil the future of our Nation .... Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to
gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die.,,219
However, while the Court has discussed the idea of academic freedom
in cases involving states' attempts to prohibit or punish teachers for
engaging in radical political speech, it has never fully articulated how the
concept protects teachers, nor what standard of scrutiny applies. For
example, in striking down a loyalty oath required of state employees as
violative of due process, Justice Frankfurter said that teachers "must have
the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into the meaning
of social and economic ideas, into the checkered history of social and
economic dogma.,,22o The implication is that teachers have a duty to freely
inquire as part of their job, and that their speech rights may therefore have
higher status under the Constitution. The Court also invoked the right of
academic freedom in overturning a university professor's contempt
conviction for failing to respond to the state attorney general's inquiries as
to his political associations and the nature of his lectures to students.221
218. Id. at 603 (internal citation omitted). After discussing academic freedom, Justice
Brennan makes it clear that the basis of the Court's rejection of the statute in question was
vagueness, and not academic freedom. See id at 603-04.
219. In Keyishian, the court further observed,

''The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost
self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is
played by those who guide and train our youth .... No field of education is so
thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made.
Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any principles are
accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion
and distrust."
Id at 603 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)); see also Silva v. Univ.
of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293, 312-315, 327 (D. N.H.1994) (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 60304.
220. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., joined by Douglas, J.,
concurring).
221. See id. at 191,196.
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Such inquiries violated the professors' rights of political expression and
academic freedom. 222
In 1960 the Court held unconstitutional a state law which required
public school teachers, as a condition of employment, to file affidavits
disclosing all organizations to which they had belonged in the past five
years.223 The statute was found to be overly broad and unnecessarily
intruding on teachers' associational freedoms. 224 Academic freedom was
also discussed at length in Epperson v. Arkansas,225 where a unanimous
Supreme Court struck down an Arkansas statute which made the teaching
of evolution in public schools a criminal offense.226 Although the Court
based its decision on the Establishment Clause, it noted that "[t]he vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools." The court further noted that it would
"not hesitate to condemn ... 'arbitrary' restrictions upon the freedom of
teachers to teach and students to learn.,,227
On the other hand, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of a
federal statute granting the Attorney General discretion to deny admission
to an alien who advocated communism, despite the academic-freedom
protests asserted by American university professors who wished to meet
and speak with him. In discussing the right to receive information and
ideas, the Court relied on a variety of non-academic freedom cases. 228 In
222. See Swe~, 354 U.S. at 250. Concurring, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan discussed the
political and academic issues at length, and at one point equated academic and political speech (in
both "thought and action are presumptively immune from inquisition by political authority"), and
at another, quoting liberally from an address by T.H. Huxley at the opening of Johns Hopkins
University. Id. at 255-267 (Frankfurter, J.,joined by Harlan, J., concurring).
223. See Shelton, 364 U.S. at 485-86, 490.
224. See id at 490. Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate dissent, in which he said that the
state's interest in guaranteeing teacher fitness was compelling and not violative of academic
freedom, absent any evidence that the information was used to disqualify teachers on the basis of
their membership in certain organizations. See id at 495-96.
225. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
226. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98-99, 102-09.
227. See id. at 105 (quoting Shelton, 364 U.S. at 487). Justices Black and Stewart concurred,
finding the statute to be unconstitutionally vague and unclear as to whether teachers were
prohibited from teaching evolution or from merely mentioning the subject. Id. at 110, 115
(Black, J., concurring) (Stewart, J., concurring).
228. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc., v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 370-71, 390-91, 400-01
(1969) (upholding FCC's fairness doctrine granting access rights to those holding differing views
from the broadcast media); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (right to possess and use
pornographic material in one's home); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 302 n.l, 305
(1965) (striking down statute permitting government to refuse to deliver communist propaganda
from abroad unless addressee requested its delivery in writing); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
519, 534 (1945) (right of labor organizer to speak and of workers to hear him, regardless of
whether organizer was registered to solicit with the state); Martin v. City of Struthers. 319 U.S.
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holding that a Louisiana statute requiring the teaching of creationism
alongside evolution violated the Establishment Clause, the Court
interpreted the statute's stated secular purpose, "academic freedom," as
merely a pretext to advance a Christian view of science.229 However, few
cases describe academic freedom as a right to teach or advance one's
ideas. 23o Most of them identify a "right of inquiry" similar to that found
outside the classroom, which is otherwise protected by associational
(before associational rights were recognized) and due process rights. 231
Two somewhat conflicting sentiments, including the state's right to
run the school system versus the Court's duty to enforce the Constitution,232
illustrate the difficulty a clearly articulated right to academic freedom
141-42, 149 (1943) (right to disseminate religious literature door-to-door).
229. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586, 589, 594 (1987). "The Act does not grant
teachers a flexibility that they did not already possess to supplant the present science curriculum
with the presentation of theories, besides evolution, about the origin oflife." Id. at 587.
If the [legislature'S] purpose was solely to "maximize the comprehensiveness and
effectiveness of science instruction, it would have encouraged the teaching of all
scientific theories about the origins of humankind. But under the Act's requirements,
teachers who were once free to teach any and all facets of this subject are now unable
to do so.

Id at 588-89. Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's definition of academic freedom. In the
context of the Louisiana law, he did not analogize it to instructor's freedom (''the freedom of
teachers to teach what they will") but to the student's right to lrnow ("student's freedom from
indoctrination"). Id. at 627, 631-32. The majority, however, noted that the "students' freedom
from indoctrination" language was later deleted from the statute, and that the expert relied on by
the Act's sponsors at legislative hearings interpreted the phrase "academic freedom" to mean ''the
freedom to teach science." Id. at 589 n.9.
230. See University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312, 318-19 (1978) (affirming
university's freedom to make its own decisions); Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (identifYing four types of institutional academic freedom: "to determine... on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study") Id.; but see Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) (academic
freedom does not apply to non-academic activities). Legal scholars have also disagreed about
whether academic freedom is recognized as constitutional right. See Compare, Developments in
the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. R. 1045, 1065 (1968) (questioning existence of
academic freedom as a constitutional right); Civil Rights-Academic Freedom, Secrecy and
Subjectivity as Obstacles to Proving a Title VII Sex Discrimination Suit in Academia, 60 N.C. L.
REv. 438, 446 (1982) (suggesting that academic freedom has attained the status of a
constitutional right); see also Epperson, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05; Edwards, 482 U.S. 578, 599
(powell J., concurring).
231. See, e.g., Norstrand v. Balmer, 335 P.2d 10 (Wis. 1959).
232. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104. "Our courts, however, have not failed to apply the First
Amendment's mandate in our educational system where [it is] essential to safeguard the
fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief." Id. "And more important, it
would not place this Court in the unenviable position of violating the principle of leaving the
States absolutely free to choose their own curriculums for their own schools so long as their
action does not palpably conflict with a clear constitutional command." Id. at 112.
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inside the classroom would raise. On one hand, meaningful education
depends on free inquiry by instructors and students; on the other, the state's
broad discretion as to how to run its schools and inculcate civic values
(especially in lower schools) requires consistency and orthodoxy. A
strongly worded declaration of academic freedom inside the classroom
could allow teachers to invoke the Constitution to override decisions by
superiors.
Some lower courts have articulated a concept of academic freedom.
For example, once contracted to appear at a public university, a speaker
might assert a right to academic freedom to prevent a subsequent denial of
the right to speak due to the controversial nature of his speech.233 Others
have held that academic freedom does not outweigh a school board's
authority to prescribe curriculum, and/or that certain types of teacher
speech were less worthy of protection than others.234

233. See Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (D. Or. 1976); see also Keefe v.
Geanakos, 418 F.2d. 359, 361-63 (1st Cir. 1969) (teacher suspended for distributing an issue of
Atlantic Monthly magazine to students which contained offensive language, after being warned
not to by a school committee, would probably succeed on his academic freedom claim on
remand); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657, 658-59, 662 (S.D. Tex 1972)
(teacher's dismissal for using a book on race relations not in authorized curriculum violated his
First Amendment right to choose his own teaching methods, provided they served a
"demonstrated educational purpose"); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1388, 1392-93 (D.
Mass.) (teacher's dismissal for writing of the word ''Fuck'' on the blackboard for purposes ofa
lesson violated his rights of expression and academic freedom, based on the standard that teachers
who use methods not proven to have the support of the preponderant opinion of the profession
may not be discharged, unless the state can show that the teacher was put on actual notice as to
the consequences), affd per curiam, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (1st Cir. 1971) (noting that the
regulation at issue was unconstitutionally vague); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 356
(M.D. Ala. 1970) (teacher's dismissal for assigning Kurt Vonnegut's, Welcome to the Monkey
House, violated her right to academic freedom). In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the
Court held that a state ban on the teaching of foreign languages in public and private schools
violated substantive due process, including the right of teachers to teach, the right of students to
acquire useful knowledge, and the right of the students' parents to have the teacher instruct their
children German. See id. at 396-97,399-400,403.
234. See Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 584, 586 (5th Cir. 1986) (college teacher's use of
profanity not protected by the First Amendment); Cary v. Board of Education, 598 F.2d 535, 539,
542, 544 (10th Cir. 1979) (recognizing right of academic freedom, but holding that teachers could
not teach the books banned by the Board so long as, on remand, it was found that the books were
not banned on the basis of the Board's "personal predilections"); Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d
1169, 1171, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dismissal of instructor Air Force Language School due to his
expression of anti-war sentiments and tales of discrimination he had suffered as a Jew did not
violate his First Amendment rights); Burns v. Rovaldi, 477 F. Supp. 270, 272, 277-78 (D. Conn.
1979) (Board. of Education's interest in preventing "sectarian or partisan instruction" outweighed
teacher's First Amendment interest in allowing his students to read pen-pal letters from his
fiancee which advocated Communism); Mercer v. Board of Education, 379 F. Supp. 580, 582,
586-87 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (public school teacher was bound to obey state's prohibition against
the teaching of birth control to students, since he had no constitutional right to teach information
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Some commentators have proposed that academic freedom be
accepted as part of the common law,235 be construed as an implied
contractual term,236 or codified into statute.237 Courts have yet to adopt any
of these suggestions to date.
3. Challenges

Although the almost universal acceptance of academic freedom
sometimes prompts professors and laymen alike to consider the subject
somewhat moot,238 the concept has come under increasing attack in recent
years, particularly by radical feminists. 239 The claim is that academic
freedom serves to mask "bourgeois values" or "ethnocentric
assumptions.,,240 To the extent that this idea has gained currency, the whole
notion of academic freedom is in jeopardy.
C. SHADES OF REALITY
Thus it can be seen that, under both the First Amendment and the
doctrine of academic freedom, campus speakers clearly possess both rights

"beyond the scope of the established curriculum"), affd memo 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
235. See, e.g., Robert F. Ladenson, Is Academic Freedom Necessary?, 5 LAW & PHIL. 59, 66
(1986) (exploring the ways in which Academic Freedom can be integrated into the law as a
"specially protected class").
236. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin & Robert Ladenson, University Faculty Members' Right to
Dissent: Toward a Unified Theory ofContactual and Constitutional Protection, 16 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 933, at 959-73 (1983).
237. See, e.g., Robert M. O'Neill, Academic Freedom and the Constitution, 11 J.C. & U.L.
275,290 (1984).
238. See Polishook, supra note 201, at 146 (describing the proliferation of the notion of
Academic Freedom since the 1960's).
239. In a Letter circulated to campus organizations at the University of New Hampshire by an
associate professor of women's studies, quoted in Richard Bernstein, Guilty If Charged, N.Y ..
REVIEW OF BOOKS, Jan. 13, 1994, at 14, the following critique was made:
The AAUP, indeed, academia itself, has traditionally been dominated by white
heterosexual men and the First Amendment and Academic Freedom (I'll call them
FAF) have traditionally protected the rights of white heterosexual men. Most of us
are silenced by existing social conditions before we get the power to speak out in any
way where FAF might protect us. So forgive us if we don't get all teary-eyed about
FAF. Perhaps to you it's as sacrosanct as the flag or the national anthem; to us strict
construction of the First Amendment is just another yoke around our necks. Id

See also STANLEY E. FISH, THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING,
TOO, 201-02 (1993).
240. Gary Pavela, Deconstructing Academic Freedom, 22 J.C. & U.L. 359, 362 (1995) (book
review).
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and obligations. But legal principles and academic ideals sometimes mask
the realities. Just as constitutional and academic guarantees are not
absolute, their application is often a double-edged sword. As we have seen,
the same places where such a liberty was vociferously advocated in the
'Sixties were the very sites of its repression in the 'Nineties. The same
people who stridently object to "Eurocentric white male-dominated"
orthodoxies show themselves to be rigid about their own multicultural and
deconstructionist agendas.241 Many modem proponents of academic
freedom appear to invoke it only on behalf of those who buy into a radical
perspective. Their critique of traditional merit systems may have distinct
anti-Semitic repercussions as well. Their assault on truth and memory
renders established norms of reason and logic virtually useless.
The multiculturalist momentum (some might call it an onslaught) also
makes it difficult to deal with bigotry masquerading as academic discourse
and to respond to the inevitable and underlying question, what rights and
responsibilities can be supported by the law? The rulings vary from case to
case. A statewide regulation in West Virginia prohibited the sale of items
or solicitation of funds on a public college campus, as well as distribution
ofliterature by outside organizations?42 The court found that the regulation
at issue was a reasonable "manner" restriction that did not unduly restrict
the plaintiffs' right to free expression.243 The court further stated that the
college campus was "generally open for public debate," but that restricting
fund-raising by outside groups was a valid means of furthering educational
goals by protecting students from the diversion of often-unwanted
solicitation.244 More recently, the same court held that a preacher had no
First Amendment right to object to a state regulation invoked by the
Virginia Polytechnic Institute, which required outside speakers to obtain an
official university sponsor in order to use school facilities. 245
Perhaps the most important practical concern of universities faced
with the question of whether to provide a forum for a controversial speaker
is that of security. Can the cost of additional safety forces justify
restricting or canceling appearances by outsiders? Several lower courts
241. For a thorough critique of multiculturalism and its adherents, see generally DANIEL A.
FARBER AND SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTII IN
AMERICAN LAW (1997).

242.
243.
244.
245.

See Gloverv. Cole, 762 F.2d 1198-99 (4th Cir. 1985).
See id. at 1201, 1203.
See id. at 1203.
See Gilles v. Torgersen, 71 F.3d 497,498-501 (4th Cir. 1995). The appellate Court held

that, while the case presented "interesting" constitutional questions that may need to be resolved,
the case was not justiciable because the preacher did not assert an inability to obtain sponsorship.
See id at 500-01.
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have answered that question in the affinnative. For example, Clemson
University's denial of a request for a "Vietnam Moratorium Day
Observance," to which students from colleges across seven states would be
invited, was upheld when university officials claimed they feared a violent
disruption, given that one had occurred during a similar observance held a
few weeks earlier.246 However, a policy that attempts to deny general
university funding for controversial speakers, or that requires the host
student organization to pay for additional security, is probably invalid.
Such a rule would likely be held as unconstitutionally quelling
controversial speech, while allowing "safe" speech by allocating general
funding to pay for such speech.247 Some institutions have sought to
discourage groups from inviting hate speakers to campus by making the
groups themselves responsible for the costs of additional security or
damage-insurance policies.
This practice would likely be ruled
unconstitutional if not applied to all host groups. For similar reasons, a
university "should not permit a speaker's own security staff to dictate
security arrangements. ,,248
IV. REASON IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: COMMON-SENSE
GUIDELINES
In dealing with the new breed of controversial speakers on campus,
there is an obvious need for strong and determined leadership to underscore
the true goals of universities: education, as opposed to indoctrination;
fostering dialogue, as opposed to festering discord; emphasizing
commonality as an even higher value than diversity.249 Each case might be
handled differently, depending upon the circumstances; but in general, the

246. See generally Clemson Univ. Vietnam Moratoriwn Comm. v. Clemson Univ., 306 F.
Supp. 129 (D.S.C. 1969). Clemson would have had to bolster its own security force by
approximately 125 state marshalls to guard against violence. See id at 131. Even though the
university had previously allowed public attendance when outside speakers were invited onto
campus, the court found that it had no duty to extend constitutional rights to anyone other than its
own students and faculty. The administration had told plaintiffs that they could host a Vietnam
Moratorium Day meeting for Clemson students exclusively, inviting outside speakers of the
students' choosing, which the court found to be sufficient accordance of the students' right to free
expression. See id at 131-32. In finding that Clemson had no duty to import outside police
officers in order to control the conduct of non-Clemson students on campus, the court noted that
several other universities had recently brought in outside security forces for potentially disruptive
events, and that their ''very presence ... [was] an incitement to violence by the students." Id. at
133.
247. See Rosenbergerv. Rector and Visitors ofUniv. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-29 (1995).
248. MARcus, supra note 10, at 160.
249. See id; see also Burt Neubome, Ghosts in the Attic: Idealized Pluralism, Communit)' and
Hate Speech, 27 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 371, 398-99 (1992).
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university should seek to assure civility and a reasonable opportunity to
debate or rebut the speaker's views. In addition, the institution should
anticipate and be able to respond quickly and decisively to unexpected hate
speech.
At the same time, however, university regulations that may result in
an inhibition of free expression on campus (especially by students and
faculty) must be drafted in a manner that clearly states the educational
purposes furthered by such a policy; that is to say, the goal must be to limit
speech that "materially disrupt[s] the educational process.,,250 Once a
university adopts a policy of inviting outside speakers onto its campus, any
regulations must be narrowly tailored to achieve only the governmental
interest of preventing violence on campus.251 While universities retain the
right to determine their own academic goals, the only constitutionally
permissible restriction on free speech to attain those goals appears to be a
complete ban on all outside speakers. University officials cannot pick and
choose which views they wish students to hear. An administration's
unsupported apprehension of a campus disturbance, or its fear of offending
student groups or the community at large, are inadequate bases for refusing
to allow recognized student groups to invite controversial outside speakers
on campus. Moreover, the few cases that have upheld administrators'
regulatory actions on security bases seemed to require actual past violence
resulting from the outside speaker at issue.252
When drafting speech regulations, universities should beware that
certain phrases have been judicially struck down as unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad. For example, a regulation that prohibits "advocacy" of
unlawful action by an outside speaker will likely be deemed invalid, unless
the speaker is calling for immediate unlawful action. The mere "presence"
of a controversial person on campus as an incitement is likely an
insufficient basis for a college to bar that person's speech; the issues are
what the speaker says and does, not his presence.
"In such
circumstances ... attendant law enforcement officers must quell the mob,
not the speaker.,,253 Another problematic regulation is the type which
prohibits religious services on campus.
While such a ban is
constitutionally permitted (if not required), only religious services can be
250. Healy, 408 U.S. at 184, 187-89 (internal citation omitted).
251. See Thomas v. CoIlins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Cohen v. San Bernardino College, 883
F. Supp. 1407, 1409-10 (1995).
252. Likewise, if the speaker's past conduct is an issue, the timing of past violent episodes is
relevant; if violence occurred on a college campus many years ago, that fact standing alone may
be insufficient to ban the speaker. See Stacy, 306 F. Supp. at 976.
253. Id. at 977.
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banned, not discussion ofreIigious topicS. 254
In reviewing a university's speech policies, a court is also likely to
look for a standard of reasonableness. For example, where a regulation
requires a speaker's topic to be "relevant" or "competent" as it relates to
educational goals, the rule should specify which individual or office is to
judge what topics are relevant and what criteria will be used. Similarly, a
type of regulation that prohibits speakers who "speak in a libelous,
scurrilous or defamatory manner or in violation of public laws which
prohibit incitement to riot" would likely require specificity regarding who
will decide such matters and by what standards.255 While the courts have
held that a university's reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on
speech are constitutionally permitted, a general regulation that allows
officials to bar a speaker where the invitation or its timing are not "in the
best interests of the University" will likely be struck down as
unconstitutionally vague.256
Universities which seek to prohibit on-campus speech that disparages
or is offensive to racial and ethnic minorities may appear to further the
educational goal of maintaining order on campus, as well as restraining
"low-value" speech which possesses the sole purpose of degrading people.
However, no such code has yet to pass constitutional muster. 257
A model anti-harassment regulation has been suggested for use by
universities seeking to protect and attract minority students. It prohibits
expression that is directed at religious, racial, or historically oppressed
groups, is derogatory to the point of directly or impliedly denying the
humanity of the group, or is expressed in an exclusionary manner which
threatens the academic or social participation of the group. This type of
policy must be carefully drafted because it is content-based.258
The American Communication Association's Model Campus Speech
Code suggests four areas that state and private institutions should address.
The first focuses on the primary responsibility of the university community
to protect the right of free expression. The second obligates the university
to provide and publicize a public common area where the academic
community and non affiliated persons can peacefully dissent and
254. Id. at 975.
255. See Smith v. Univ. of Tennessee, 300 F. Supp. 777, 779, 782-83 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
256. Id at 783.
257. "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
309-310 (1940); but see generally Deborah R. Schwartz, A First Amendment Justification for
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 733 (1990).
258. See Schwartz, supra note 257, at 777-78.
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demonstrate. The third section protects any speaker who faculty or
students have invited to express his or her viewpoints. Under this section,
the university should commit itself to maintaining an atmosphere where
open, vigorous debate can occur, and provide funding to student
organizations who invite speakers on a content-neutral basis. The right to
dissent, in its many forms, is permitted so long as the audience does not
substantially interfere with the speaker's ability to communicate. Finally,
the Model Code suggests sanctions for those who violate the free speech
rights of others, including expulsion, arrest, warning, written reprimand,
sensitivity training, suspension, or a note of the violation placed on a
transcript or personnel file. 259
In general, universities must draft speech policies carefully,
considering the type of environment regulated, its resulting standard of
judicial review, and whether the regulated speech affects student/faculty
rights or those of the general public. Where the university, especially a
public college, has opened a forum to outside speakers, it is likely that a
decision to exclude controversial speakers will be held unconstitutional
unless clear and substantial evidence suggests the likelihood of serious
disturbances on campus. Just as students and faculty at a public institution
cannot be denied an exchange of ideas and opinions, initiated either by
themselves or outsiders, neither are university administrators powerless to
maintain order in pursuing their educational mission.
University officials faced with the prospect of a controversial speaker
on campus should make it clear that neither violence, destruction of
property, nor hecklers' vetoes permitted. On the other hand, counterdemonstrations to hate speech will likewise be protected, as will protests on
other controversial issues. Moreover, in appropriate circumstances such
demonstrations may be joined by administrators and other campus leaders.
Civil discourse should always be encouraged, with the university taking the
moral high ground.260 In addition, virtually any college or university,
whether public or private, should adhere to guidelines suggested by a
careful and reasoned review of established case law and commentary:
•

Develop and publish the procedures that must be followed in
order for an outside speaker to be brought onto campus.
Contact everyone in the chain of administrative command

259. ACA Model Campus Speech Code, available in, <http://cavern.uark.edulcomminfo/www/
campus.speech.html>.
260. The president of the university or college should know about controversial speakers and
advise those who invited them to consider the repercussions and perhaps urge them to withdraw
the invitation. He or she might consider reaching out as well to alienated groups and joining a
protest demonstration. See MARcus, supra note 10, at 160.
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(including the president or chancellor) each time a speaker's
appearance is at issue. Do not vary from these procedures: An
exception made in one speaker's favor may be cited later by
another who's been denied a similar platform to support a claim
that the discriminatory application of the procedures violated the
Equal Protection Clause.
•

Make the basesfor canceling a speaker clear and /h(trough, and
apply them consistently. A speaker can be constitutionally
barred or canceled if (a) there is a likelihood of clear and
present danger on the basis ofpast appearances that resulted in
disruptions (or if students who oppose the speaker present a
realistic threat of imminent violence),261 and/or (b) the
sponsoring institution is unable to meet security requirements. 262
Even though this choice might have the effect of a heckler's
veto, the university should assert its responsibility to avoid a
material disruption of the educational process.263 Arguments can
also be made that the public university is less capable than the
state itself in managing violent confrontations resulting from
public speech; that, acting to a limited degree in loco parentis, it
has a greater responsibility to protect against violent responses
by their students than does the state to curb those of its citizens;
and that it should have the capacity to punish those who create
disruptions on campus (by either canceling the speaker's
engagement and/or expelling the students who threatened the
trouble).

•

Do not cancel a speaker based merely on the content of the

261. This rule may be applied even if the speaker played not part in the disturbance. Although
there may be no clear and present danger if the speaker is attacked by hecklers, the likelihood of
such a scenario may still qualify under existing jurisprudence as the type of potential disruption
which satisfies the Constitution in a pUblic-university setting. See Holmes, supra note 48, at AI,
BIO (noting that Howard turned down a request by Muhammad to speak at Howard a third time
after he was wounded at a rally in California); see also Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332, 133335 (6th Cir. 1972) (student's jacket modeled on rebel flag was banned as a "provocative symbol"
about one year after the school had to discontinue using the Confederate flag as their school flag
because this had incited various disturbances that culminated in the imposition of a city-wide
curfew).
262. This standard would have less of an effect on speakers who can supply their own
security, although the choice of security should be left to the college or university. A school
might decline to use a speaker's own security force if it fears that by doing so it would
compromise its own standards. See Melillo & Harris, supra note 50, at Bl (reporting that when
the Howard auditorium started filling up, the Nation ofIslam security force gave priority seating
to black men).
263. See Pam Belluck, Appearance by Farrakhan Aide Roils a CUNY Campus, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1995, at B3. The reporter discusses the decision of CUNY's President to let Muhammad
speak, though he had tried to cancel his speech, for fear that students who supported him would
be injured in a clash with police. Certainly this is not a heckler's veto situation (it is in fact the
opposite), but if the possibility of violence to students inspired a President to cancel a speaker,
some courts might overlook the heckler's veto.
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speech or the speaker's reputation or character. 264
•

Refrain from using "legalese. ,,265

•

In the absence of exceptional circumstances, grant only one or
two administrators the power to cancel a speaker's
appearance. 266

•

Do not allow a controversial speaker unilaterally to dictate
security arrangements.
V. CONCLUSION

Most courts adhere to a public policy that the university should be
preserved as a "marketplace of ideas," while at the same time maintaining
the right of administrators to make decisions they deem in the best interest
of their institution's educational mission. The tension inherent in those
competing values is reflected by what happens when controversial speech
occurs on campus. Much of the case law is a vestige of campus unrest in
the late '60's and early '70's, when the courts sought strongly to protect
what they perceived as the constitutional right of students to hear all types
of views on any subject. That principle has been sorely tested with the rise
of politically-correct and radical agendas, promoted by academic
deconstructionists and outspoken social reformers. One result has been the
promulgation of speech and conduct codes - all of which when challenged
in court, have to date been found unconstitutional.
Those speech and conduct codes which have yet to be challenged
continue to be applied arbitrarily. New rules and regulations, and the
inevitable litigation they spawn, are likely to be seen in the future - unless
universities adopt policies and procedures that allow them to keep
controversial speech on campus within realistic and constitutional limits,
while encouraging vigorous, constructive, and responsible commerce in the
marketplace of ideas.
The guidelines offered above should be useful for that purpose, while
at the same time keeping proponents of hate, such as Khalid Muhammad,
constitutionally at bay.

264. See, e.g., Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486, 497 (M.D. N.C. 1968); Snyder v. Board
ofTrustees, 286 F. Supp. 927, 933-934 (N.D. III. 1968).
265. Do not, for example, ban all speakers who would create a "clear or present danger" or
"material disruption" on campus. Such language wiII likely be held void for vagueness. See
Stacy, 306 F. Supp. at 976-977.
266. Even then, the power should be exercised only where there are clearly constitutional
grounds to do so and the administration is invoked to give the appearance of fmality. See, e.g.,
Brooks, 412 F.2d at 1173 (internal citation omitted); Stacy, 306 F. Supp. at 971.

